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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Alaska Law Review’s Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of selected state and 
federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law. They are neither comprehensive in breadth, as 
several cases are omitted, nor in depth, as many issues within individual cases are omitted. 
Attorneys should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended 
to alert the Alaska legal community to judicial decisions from the previous year. The summaries 
are grouped by subject matter. Within each subject matter, the summaries are organized 
alphabetically. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough 
In DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,1 the court held that although the legislature provides 
a remedy for property owners wishing to have their property excluded from a road service area 
(“RSA”), the remedy is not mandatory and that such requests may be denied.2 In 1981, an RSA 
in Matanuska-Susitna Borough was expanded by annexing territory that had not previously been 
in the RSA—three pieces owned by Ray DeVilbiss were part of the newly annexed territory.3 In 
2011, DeVilbiss petitioned the Matanuska-Susitna Borough Assembly remove his property from 
the RSA, his petition was denied.4 DeVilbiss filed a complaint against the Borough and 
subsequently both filed for summary judgment on the entire case.5 DeVilbiss’s primary argument 
was that AS 29.35.450(c)(4) required the Borough remove his property from RSA 19.6 The 
superior court rejected DeVilbiss’s argument that the statute mandated that his property be 
removed and granted summary judgment for the Borough.7 On appeal, the court affirmed the 
superior court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that AS 29.35.450 did not establish a 
mandate to remove property from RSAs at the request of the owner.8 The court pointed to the 
legislative history of AS 29.35.450, concluding that the addition of the subsection (c)(4) in 2007 
was meant to increase the Borough’s ability to exercise judgment to exclude property like 
DeVilbiss’s from the RSA without have to seek voter approval.9 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that the statute grants a political remedy to property owners, but 
it does not create a judicial remedy requiring Boroughs to exclude property from an RSA at the 
request of property owners.10 
 
Estrada v. State 
In Estrada v. State,11 the supreme court held that charges brought under agency regulations 
promulgated without following the requirements of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) should be dismissed.12 The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (the Department) 
issued a statewide regulation specifying how many fish may be harvested annually under a 
subsistence fishing permit.13 Estrada and three other Angoon fishermen challenged the regulation 
after they were charged with taking more salmon than their permits allowed.14 Namely, the 
fishermen argued that since the harvest limits had not been promulgated in accordance with the 
APA, it could not form the basis of their prosecution.15 The district court agreed with the 
fisherman, but when the state appealed, the court of appeals deferred to the agency and 
                                                
1 356 P.3d 290 (Alaska 2015). 
2 Id. at 295. 
3 Id. at 292.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 293. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 296. 
9 Id. at 295. 
10 Id. at 296. 
11 362 P.3d 1021.  
12 Id. at 1022. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
 3 
reversed.16 On appeal to the supreme court, the court reasoned that the Department’s harvest 
limits indeed constituted a regulation (which the State disputed so as to relieve the Department of 
formal APA requirements), since they were used to interpret, make specific, and implement a 
statutory requirement, and they were used not as an internal guideline but rather as a tool in 
dealing with the public.17 The court further reasoned that the APA requires agencies satisfy 
formal notice and comment requirements in promulgating valid regulations, while here the 
parties stipulated the Department failed to comply with the APA in adopting the harvest 
limits.18 Reversing the court of appeals’ decision and reinstating the district court’s judgment of 
dismissal, the supreme court held that charges brought under agency regulations promulgated 
without following the requirements of the APA should be dismissed.19 
 
Haar v. State, Dep’t of Administration 
In Haar v. State, Dep’t of Administration,20 the supreme court held that the Division of Motor 
Vehicles (“DMV”) had reasonable basis to deny title and registration for a non-standard vehicle 
when compliance with safety standards was not satisfactorily demonstrated.21 Haar applied for a 
low-speed vehicle title and registration for her 1972 Noland car.22 Initial DMV inspections 
denied title based on the lack of any indication the manufacturer had followed federal safety 
standards or that the vehicle met those standards.23 An administrative hearing again found the car 
did not meet title requirements.24 The superior court affirmed the agency decision.25 On appeal, 
Haar argued that the agency decision was in error because it relied on factors not listed in the 
statute and because she had presented sufficient evidence of compliance with safety 
standards.26 The supreme court applied the reasonable basis standard of review because the 
titling decision implicated agency expertise.27 Reviewing the entire record, the supreme court 
found that Haar’s evidence was conclusory and failed to demonstrate actual compliance.28 Haar’s 
failure to demonstrate actual compliance provided the agency with substantial evidence and a 
reasonable basis in law to deny the title.29 The supreme court held that the DMV had reasonable 
basis to deny title and registration for a non-standard vehicle when compliance with safety 
standards was not satisfactorily demonstrated.30 
 
                                                
16 Id. at 1022–23. 
17 Id. at 1024. 
18 Id. at 1025–26.  
19 Id. at 1026. 
20 349 P.3d 173 (Alaska 2015). 
21 Id. at 175. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 176. 
24 Id. at 177. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 178. 
27 Id. at 180. 
28 Id. at 179–80. 
29 Id. at 181. 
30 Id. at 175. 
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McGlinchy v. State, Department of Natural Resources 
In McGlinchy v. State, Department of Natural Resources,31 the supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision holding that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had not misapplied the 
law in denying the appellants permit to mine a mineral deposit for use as construction rock.32 In 
May 2010, M & M Constructors, owned by James P. McGlinchy submitted a Plan of Operation 
to DNR requesting a permit to mine the land under 30 U.S.C. § 22, the General Mining Law of 
1872 to develop the Flag Hill deposit to supply a nearby Alaska Railroad project.33 A DNR 
committee concluded that the Flag Hill rock was common variety under the Common Varieties 
Act of 1955—and therefore nonlocatable, a requirement to allow mining under the General 
Mining Law of 1872.34 M & M appealed the decision and requested a hearing that the 
Commissioner of DNR granted rendering the same decision that the Flag Hill rock was not 
locatable.35 M & M appealed the Commissioner’s final denial to the superior court on the 
grounds that the hearing officer had misapplied the law—the superior court affirmed the DNR 
decision and M & M appealed.36 The supreme court affirmed that DNR had applied the correct 
law in denying M & M’s permit to mine the Flag Hill deposit because the mineral deposit is not 
locatable nor subject to any of the exceptions under the Common Varieties Act.37 The supreme 
court reasoned that the exceptions claimed by M & M in order to mine the deposit: (1) a valuable 
constituent mineral theory38 and (2) an uncommon variety rock theory did not apply.39 The 
supreme court affirmed the DNR finding that the valuable constituent mineral theory did not 
apply because M & M planned to mine the rock as a totality and not for the constituent 
minerals.40 Additionally, the supreme court agreed with the DNR finding that the Flag Hill rock 
is not an uncommon rock because it lacks unique physical properties as outlined in the McClarty 
test.41 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the DNR did not 
misapply the law in denying a permit for mining a mineral deposit for use as a construction rock, 
where the applicant’s could not satisfy the valuable constitute mineral and uncommon variety 
rock exceptions. 
 
Nunamta Alukestai v. State 
In Nunamta Alukestai v. State,42 the supreme court held Miscellaneous Land Use Permits 
allowing intensive mineral exploration on state land are functionally irrevocable, and thus 
convey state interests in land for which public notice is required prior to the disposal of such 
interests.43 Pebble Limited Partnership (“PLP”) applied for, and received, a Miscellaneous Land 
Use Permit (“MLUP”) from the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) allowing them to 
conduct intensive mining operations in the Pebble ore deposit from 2009 to 2010.44 Nunamta, an 
                                                
31 354 P.3d 1025 (Alaska, 2015). 
32 Id. at 1027. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1027–28. 
36 Id. at 1028–29.  
37 Id. at 1029. 
38 Id. at 1030. 
39 Id. at 1032. 
40  Id. at 1030. 
41 Id. at 1032.  
42 341 P.3d 1041 (Alaska 2015). 
43 Id. at 1043. 
44 Id. at 1043-45. 
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association of eight Native village corporations in the Bristol Bay region, appealed the issuance 
of the MLUP by the DNR, challenging the lack of public notice prior to issuing the 
permit.45 DNR denied Nunamta’s appeal, and Nunamta filed a complaint for declaratory 
judgment in superior court.46 The superior court ruled for PLP, holding the MLUP at issue did 
not amount to a disposal of an interest in state lands under Article VIII, Section 10 of the Alaska 
Constitution, and public notice was not required.47 The supreme court reversed the superior 
court, ruling that, although licenses generally were not interests in land, the MLUP at issue was 
functionally irrevocable because its revocation would substantially destroy PLP’s investment and 
leave long-lasting changes to the land.48 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held 
MLUPs allowing intensive mineral exploration on state land are functionally irrevocable, and 
thus convey state interests in land for which public notice is required prior to the disposal of such 
interests.49 
 
Pacifica Marine, Inc. v. Solomon Gold, Inc. 
In Pacifica Marine, Inc. v. Solomon Gold, Inc.,50 the supreme court held that the Commissioner 
of the Department of Natural Resources can make a final decision on mineral bidding issues, so 
long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary.51 In 2011, the 
Department of Natural Resources (Department) auctioned 20,000 acres of mining leases, with 
the requirement that all bidders must submit a Bid Form and a Statement of 
Qualifications.52 Mike Benchoff was the high bidder on ten tracts but neglected to file a 
Statement of Qualifications, prompting the Director of the Department’s Division of Mining, 
Land & Water to grant Benchoff ten extra days to file.53 Solomon Gold, Inc., the second-highest 
bidder on four of Benchoff’s tracts, appealed this decision to the Department Commissioner, 
who later reversed the Director and rejected Benchoff’s bids.54 Benchoff and Pacifica Marine, 
Inc., a company holding some of Benchoff’s leasing rights, appealed to the superior court.55 The 
superior court held that the Commissioner’s decision was appropriate because he interpreted 
Department regulations in a manner that was largely reasonable and not arbitrary.56 Pacifica 
Marine appealed, arguing that the Commissioner’s decision was arbitrary in nature.57 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the Commissioner’s findings 
of fact are supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or unreasonable.58 The court 
further reasoned that the Commissioner found evidence proving that all bidders had ample notice 
that both forms were required.59 The court determined that the requirements were sufficiently 
                                                
45 Id. at 1045. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1050. 
48 Id. at 1057. 
49 Id. at 1043. 
50 356 P.3d 780 (Alaska 2015). 
51 Id. at 782, 795. 
52 Id. at 782–83. 
53 Id. at 783–84.  
54 Id. at 785–86.  
55 Id. at 786. 
56 Id. at 787. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 789, 793.  
59 Id. at 789. 
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clear and there was no unreasonable or unfair treatment.60 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources can make 
a final decision on mineral bidding issues, so long as the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence and not arbitrary.61 
 
State, Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell 
In State, Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell,62 the supreme court held that questions of 
law involving agency expertise are reviewed using the rational basis test.63 Following a string of 
sexually offensive behavior towards his coworkers as well as borderline dishonesty in the 
ensuing investigation of his conduct, Parcell, a police officer, found his police certificate revoked 
by the Alaska Police Standards Council (“the Council”) for lack of good moral 
character.64 Parcell then appealed to the superior court, which concluded that the Council’s moral 
character determination was not entitled to deference, because good moral character is an 
ordinary professional requirement whose meaning is not unique to the Council.65 Using 
substitution of judgment as its standard of review, the superior court deemed the revocation 
unwarranted, and reversed the Council’s decision.66 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decision and affirmed the Council’s revocation.67 The supreme court reasoned that 
the appropriate standard of review for questions of law involving agency expertise is the rational 
basis test, deferring to an agency’s application of its own rules unless the agency’s decision was 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.68 Such rational basis deference is appropriate 
even when interpreting commonly used words if the legislature has granted the agency broad 
discretion.69 The court further reasoned that the Council’s statutory mandate authorized the 
agency to establish mandatory qualifications for police officers, including moral character, and 
granted the agency broad discretion in making revocation decisions along those lines.70 Thus, the 
Council’s revocation based on a determination that Parcell lacked good moral character was well 
within the agency’s purview, and, lacking arbitrariness or unreasonableness, was entitled to 
rational basis deference.71 Reversing the lower court’s decision and affirming the Council’s 
revocation, the supreme court held that questions of law involving agency expertise are reviewed 
using the rational basis test.72 
 
State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Gross 
In State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services v. Gross,73 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Department of Health and Social Services does not need to replicate the federal Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”) analysis to determine state interim assistance benefits, but cannot deny 
                                                
60 Id. at 793–94. 
61 Id. at 782, 795. 
62 348 P.3d 882 (Alaska 2015). 
63 Id. at 886. 
64 Id. at 884–85. 
65 Id. at 886. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 889. 
68 Id. at 886. 
69 Id. at 888. 
70 Id. at 887. 
71 Id. at 888. 
72 Id. at 886. 
73 347 P.3d 116 (Alaska 2015). 
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state benefits to persons eligible for SSI who are unable to perform other work in the national 
economy.74 In December 2011, Gross applied for SSI and state benefits because of a serious 
mental disorder.75 The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step process to 
determine whether applicants are disabled and thus eligible for SSI, while the Alaska Department 
of Health and Social Services (“Department”) determines eligibility for state benefits based on 
whether the applicant will likely be found disabled by the SSA.76 After a hearing, Gross was 
found eligible for state benefits under step five because there was no evidence that he could 
perform other work in the national economy.77 The Department’s deputy commissioner 
ultimately decided against state benefits because the Department only considers steps one 
through three, but the superior court ruled that the Department must consider all five steps.78 The 
Department appealed, arguing that it only needs to follow steps one through three.79 The supreme 
court affirmed in part and reversed in part, ruling that the Department does not need to fully 
replicate the federal government’s five step SSI analysis, but that the Department cannot deny 
state benefits to persons eligible under step five.80 The court reasoned that no statutes mandate 
using the complete five step analysis, but the current statutes do require the state and federal 
analyses to be similar.81 If the Department only considered steps one through three, an entire 
category of persons eligible for SSI under section five would be excluded from state 
benefits.82 Accordingly, the Department must consider section five of the federal SSI 
analysis.83 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held the Alaska Department 
of Health and Social Services does not need to replicate the federal SSI analysis to determine 
state interim assistance benefits, but cannot deny state benefits to persons eligible for SSI who 
are unable to perform other work in the national economy.84 
  
                                                
74 Id. at 119, 126. 
75 Id. at 120. 
76 Id. at 118–19. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 126. 
81 Id. at 123–24. 
82 Id. at 125. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 119, 126. 
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BUSINESS LAW 
 
Brooks v. Horner 
In Brooks v. Horner,85 the supreme court had its first opportunity to apply the “entire fairness” 
test to a purchase of a corporate asset by a shareholder during a voluntary winding up of a 
closely held corporation.86 The closely held corporation was created for the purpose of managing 
a group of contiguous mining claims, its sole asset.87 Three shareholders held an equal stake in 
the corporation.88 With the corporation in risk of financial collapse, the shareholders elected to 
voluntarily wind up the corporation and sell off the mining claim.89 The corporation’s attorney 
drafted documents laying out the minimum bid price of $100,000, a confidentiality agreement, 
and a requirement that all bidders must provide proof of financial pre-qualification by a certain 
date.90 With only a month left until the bidding period closed, no one had yet submitted a bid for 
the claim.91 Two of the shareholders, the appellees, created a joint venture to purchase the claim 
and submitted a bid of $105,000.92 Once the deadline for bidding had passed, the shareholders 
called a special meeting to vote on the proposed bids.93 Appellees’ bid was the only qualifying 
offer submitted, and, therefore, the shareholders voted to award the mining claim to the 
appellees.94 Two months later, the third shareholder brought this suit against the appellees, 
objecting to the sale of the asset and claiming that they breached their fiduciary duty to the 
corporation by misrepresenting facts material to the sale, amongst other claims.95 In an apparent 
matter of first impression, the supreme court examined whether the sale qualified as “just and 
reasonable,” under the “entire fairness” test used in instances of self-interested transactions by 
parties that hold a fiduciary duty to the corporation it is representing.96 This test examines 
whether the price and manner in which the deal took place are at least as favorable as would have 
been achieved without the fiduciary’s conflict of interest.97 Since the asset was sold above a 
minimum bid price that was agreed upon before the conflict of interest arose1498 and appellees 
did not withhold any material fact that would have altered the decision of a reasonable 
shareholder,99 the supreme court upheld the lower court’s ruling that the sale was just and 
reasonable.100 
 
                                                
85 344 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2015). 
86 Id. at 301. 
87 Id. at 296. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 297. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 301. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 301–02. 
99 Id. at 299. 
100 Id. at 302. 
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Pister v. State, Dept. of Revenue 
In Pister v. State, Dept. of Revenue,101 the supreme court held that res judicata does not bar the 
State from seeking to pierce a corporation’s corporate veil to collect upon a tax debt.102 Dr. Pister 
owns a radiology business called Northwest Medical Imaging, which in 1997 the Alaska 
Department of Revenue assessed for unpaid taxes, penalties and interests.103 The Office of Tax 
appeals entered a judgment against Northwest Medical for $123,188 and the State filed a 
complaint in 2008 seeking to collect that judgment from Pister personally.104 The superior court 
held that the corporation’s veil could be pierced in order to do so.105 The shareholders and 
corporation appealed arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the suit under the 
principle of res judicata.106 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
piercing the corporate veil is not a claim for damages, instead it is a means of imposing liability 
on an underlying cause.107 It is a procedural rather than a substantive claim.108 Moreover, the 
supreme court noted that other courts that have considered this question agree that veil piercing 
should not be barred by res judicata.109 Affirming the lower courts decision, the supreme court 
held that res judicata does not bar the State from seeking to piece a corporation’s corporate veil 
to collect upon a tax debt.110 
  
                                                
101 354 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2015). 
102 Id. at 360. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 361. 
106 Id. at 360. 
107 Id. at 362. 
108 Id. at 363.  
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 360. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Alaska Commercial Fishermen’s Memorial in Juneau v. City and Borough of Juneau 
In Alaska Commercial Fishermen’s Memorial in Juneau v. City and Borough of Juneau,111 the 
supreme court held that the superior court did not err in dismissing a case as unripe and granting 
judgment on the pleadings, when presented with only hypothetical facts.112 Juneau planned to 
build a dock on the waterfront, and sought the transfer of state lands.113 Alaska Commercial 
Fishermen’s Memorial, an organization, annually hosted a blessing of fishing boats on the 
waterfront and filed suit against Juneau, seeking to enjoin the city from moving forward with its 
dock project.114 Following multiple motions, the superior court denied the organization’s motions 
and granted motion for judgment on the pleadings to Juneau, stating that the organization had 
failed to demonstrate the presence of an actual controversy.115 On appeal, the supreme court 
affirmed the dismissal, because no evidence in the record demonstrated that Juneau had or 
intended to trespass or start construction on state lands prior to the lands’ transfer, which meant 
only hypothetical facts had been presented.116 Because a claim cannot be supported using solely 
hypothetical facts, the organization’s claims were not ripe, and, therefore, the organization 
lacked standing to sue and the dismissal and grant of judgment on the pleadings by the superior 
court were reasonable.117 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a claim is 
unripe when supported by hypothetical facts, and dismissal is the appropriate response to a lack 
of standing.118 
 
Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Ltd. Partnership 
In Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Ltd. Partnership,119 the supreme court held that a 
key inquiry in deciding whether to award attorneys’ fees under a statute protecting constitutional 
lawsuits is whether the plaintiff had any direct economic interest in the claim.120 Alaska 
Conservation Foundation and other non-profit organizations unsuccessfully sued Pebble Ltd. 
Partnership and the State of Alaska, challenging the constitutionality of a permitting process for 
a mining project.121 The State sought to collect attorney’s fees.122 The non-profits sought 
protection under a statute that shields legitimate constitutional claimants, who lack an economic 
interest in their lawsuit, from paying attorneys’ fees.123 On appeal, the non-profits argued that the 
lower court should not have allowed discovery into their private financial records.124 The 
supreme court ruled that the nature of the claim, the relief sought, and the direct economic 
benefits at stake should be evaluated in determining whether a sufficient economic interest exists 
                                                
111 357 P.3d 1172 (Alaska 2015).  
112 Id. at 1175–77.  
113 Id. at 1173. 
114 Id. at 1174. 
115 Id. at 1175. 
116 Id. at 1176. 
117 Id. at 1176–77. 
118 Id. at 1175–77. 
119 350 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2015). 
120 Id. at 286. 
121 Id. at 275. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 278. 
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under the constitutional litigation statute.125 The court reasoned that no direct economic interests 
were implicated by the permitting claim, only indirect interests.126 Reversing the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a key inquiry in awarding attorneys’ fees under a statute 
governing constitutional lawsuits is whether the plaintiff had a direct economic interest in its 
claim.127 
 
Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. First National Bank Alaska 
In Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. First National Bank Alaska,128 the supreme court held that direct 
discrepancies in deposition testimony across two cases are generally not sufficiently egregious to 
constitute fraud on the court under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).129 Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. (“AFG”) 
sued their lender, First National Bank Alaska (“the Bank”), alleging fraudulent inducement to 
invest based on a loan officer’s conduct.130 At a second trial in 2010, AFG was awarded 
apportioned damages, enhanced attorneys’ fees for the first trial in 2008, and standard fees for 
the second trial.131 AFG appealed the denial of their fraud upon the court motions, desiring 
enhanced fees for the 2010 trial.132 On appeal, AFG argued that deposition statements made by 
senior Bank officials in other litigation post-dating the 2008 trial revealed knowledge of the loan 
officer’s violations of Bank policies beginning in 2005.133 The same Bank officials had presented 
contradictory testimony in the 2008 trial that they were unaware of any such policy 
violations.134 Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
holding specifying that fraud on the court should be limited to the most egregious circumstances 
of procedural corruption causing injury to many litigants.135 While potentially false and 
misleading, the Bank officials’ statements were not sufficiently egregious because they were 
based purely on later-discovered perjury in litigation not directly related to AFG’s claim.136 AFG 
had additionally already received remedy in the form of relief from judgment, a second trial, and 
enhanced attorneys’ fees.137 Affirming the lower court, the supreme court held direct 
discrepancies in deposition testimony across two cases are generally not sufficiently egregious to 
constitute fraud on the court under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).138 
 
Barber v. Schmidt 
In Barber v. Schmidt,139 the supreme court held a class action cannot be certified with pro se 
litigants at the helm.140 In May 2012, a group of six Alaska prisoners collectively filed a putative 
class-action complaint against Department of Corrections (“Department”) Commissioner Joseph 
                                                
125 Id. at 283-84. 
126 Id. at 285. 
127 Id. at 286.  
128 345 P.3d 76 (Alaska 2015). 
129 Id. at 87–88. 
130 Id. at 82. 
131 Id. at 85. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 87. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 86. 
136 Id. at 87–88. 
137 Id. at 88. 
138 Id. At 87–88. 
139 354 P.3d 158 (Alaska 2015). 
140 Id. at 161. 
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Schmidt and other Department officials.141 The complaint included eighteen causes of action, 
alleging violations of the prisoners’ rights under both the Alaska and United States 
Constitutions.142 Many of the alleged violations pertained to Department policy changes 
regarding inmate purchase and possession of video gaming systems and mature-rated video 
games.143 One of the inmates, Jack Earl, Jr., moved for class certification under Alaska Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(a).144 The superior court denied Earl’s motion, ruling that a pro se plaintiff 
cannot represent a class in a class-action lawsuit.145 Although Earl raised the issue on appeal, he 
conceded that applicable precedent precluded pro se litigants from representing a class under 
Civil Rule 23(a).146 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, ruling that Civil 
Rule 23(a) could not be satisfied in Earl’s case without the appointment of counsel.147 Affirming 
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held a class action cannot be certified with pro se 
litigants at the helm.148 
 
Cooper v. Thompson 
In Cooper v. Thompson,149 the supreme court held that a lower court erred in excluding evidence 
of domestic violence in a case that evaluated compensatory damages relating to a continuing 
injury from an automobile accident.150 In 2008, Cooper, a driver for Central Plumbing & 
Heating, caused a car accident that injured Thompson.151 In the following months, Thompson 
complained of neck and back pain, and had surgery to correct the pain in 2009.152 During this 
same period, Thompson was dating a woman who committed various instances of domestic 
assault against him.153 After filing suit, Thompson asked that evidence of the domestic violence 
be excluded, which the superior court granted, finding that the evidence was more so unfairly 
prejudicial than probative.154 The jury subsequently awarded Thompson nearly one and a half 
million dollars in damages.155 On appeal, Central argued that the excluded evidence of domestic 
violence was relevant to the determination of compensatory damages, and could be admitted 
without unfairly prejudicing the jury.156 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
found that the superior court abused its discretion in its wholesale exclusion of the evidence of 
domestic violence.157 The supreme court noted that the type of domestic assaults committed by 
Thompson’s former girlfriend were such that they could have cause injuries similar to those 
allegedly caused by the automobile accident.158 The assaults therefore qualified as potentially 
                                                
141 Id. at 160. 
142 Id. at 159. 
143 Id. at 159-60. 
144 Id. at 160.  
145 Id. 
146 Id.at 161.  
147 Id. 
148 Id.  
149 353 P.3d 782 (Alaska 2015). 
150 Id. at 791. 
151 Id. at 785. 
152 Id. at 787. 
153 Id. at 787. 
154 Id. at 787–790. 
155 Id. at 785. 
156 Id. at 790–791. 
157 Id. at 789. 
158 Id. at 790. 
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significant intervening trauma, which could be relevant to a jury’s evaluation of 
damages.159 Reversing the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that the lower court 
erred in excluding evidence of domestic violence in a case that evaluated compensatory damages 
in relation to an injury from an automobile accident.160 
 
Erica G. v. Taylor Taxi, Inc. 
In Erica G. v. Taylor Taxi, Inc.,161 the supreme court held that to establish excusable neglect in 
failing to respond to an opposing party’s motion for summary judgment, a patron must show a 
causal link between the excusable neglect and the patron’s failure to timely act.162 Erica G. 
brought a negligence suit against Taylor Taxi, Inc., claiming damages for an alleged sexual 
assault she suffered by a licensed taxi driver operating under a permit issued to Taylor 
Taxi.163 Taylor Taxi moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds, and the deadline for 
opposition came and went without any action by Erica or her attorneys.164 Consequently, the 
superior court granted Taylor Taxi’s motion.165 Pursuant to state rules of civil procedure, Erica 
then moved for an extension of time based on excusable neglect, with she and her attorneys 
filing affidavits citing several hardships: during the filing period, Erica was pregnant and had 
pending criminal charges; Erica suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder following the 
alleged sexual assault as well as the death of her son, making her difficult to contact; and her 
attorneys were overburdened with a particularly heavy caseload and disruption of mail service 
following an office relocation.166 However, these affidavits never contested Taylor Taxi’s 
contention that it actually mailed all pleadings directly to the new office address, while one 
attorney’s affidavit contradictorily pointed to a clerical error as the initial cause of the missed 
deadline (as opposed to Erica’s absence).167 The superior court denied Erica’s motion, noting that 
no excusable neglect had been shown for extension of time after the expiration of time for filing 
an opposition to the summary judgment motion.168 On appeal, the supreme court upheld the 
superior court’s judgment, reasoning that there must be a causal link between the instances of 
excusable neglect and the party’s failure to timely act.169 The litany of explanations in the 
affidavits failed to assert a nexus between the various hardships and missing the deadline for 
opposition or a motion seeking more time to respond.170 Therefore, affirming the lower court, the 
supreme court held that to establish excusable neglect in failing to respond to an opposing 
party’s motion for summary judgment, a patron must show a causal link between instances of 
excusable neglect and the patron’s failure to timely act.171 
 
Fernandez v. Fernandez 
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In Fernandez v. Fernandez,172 the supreme court held that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) in concluding that a sham marriage dissolution filing 
constituted fraud upon the court.173 The Fernandezes filed for dissolution of their marriage in 
1986 after having two children together, but they continued living together as husband and wife 
until 2007.174 They stipulated that they filed for dissolution only to shield some marital assets 
from bankruptcy.175 In 2010, the former wife attempted to enforce child support obligations 
dating back to 1986 and the former husband moved for relief.176 The superior court granted 
equitable remedy to the former husband by setting aside the 1986 dissolution as fraud upon the 
court and ordering child support beginning on the date of actual separation.177 On appeal, the 
former wife argued that the lower court abused its discretion in setting aside the 
dissolution.178 The supreme court reasoned that the sham dissolution did not solely concern 
private parties.179 Rather, it defiled the court system as a whole180 by granting windfalls to both 
parties, undermining bankruptcy proceedings, and interfering with public protections for 
investors.181 Moreover, the former husband requested relief under Rule 60(b) within a reasonable 
time given all the circumstances.182 Affirming the lower court’s action, the supreme court found 
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the parties’ sham dissolution as 
fraud upon the court.183 
 
Geotek Alaska, Inc. v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. 
In Geotek Alaska, Inc. v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.,184 the supreme court held that the right 
to decline arbitration shall only be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.185 The arbitrator was 
overseeing a contract dispute between Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. and GeoTek 
Alaska.186 Jacobs did not have a contract with GeoTek, but Jacob’s contract included a ‘flow 
down’ on all terms and conditions to any sub-subcontract, such as the one with GeoTek.187 When 
Jacobs received the demand for arbitration, they stated that they rejected the demand, but 
GeoTek went ahead with the proceedings and the arbitrator awarded GeoTek 
$257,687.62.188 GeoTek filed a complaint in superior court seeking to confirm the arbitration 
award, but the court concluded that Jacobs was not legally obligated to participate in the 
arbitration.189 On appeal, GeoTek argues that it was up to the arbitrator to decide whether Jacobs 
had exercises its right to reject arbitration.190 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
                                                
172 358 P.3d 562 (Alaska 2015). 
173 Id. at 564. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 564–65.  
178 Id. at 565. 
179 Id. at 567.  
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 570. 
182 Id. at 569. 
183 Id. at 571. 
184 2015 WL 4774257 (Alaska 2015). 
185 Id. at 369. 
186 Id. at 370. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 371. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
 15 
decision, reasoning that Alaska statutes provide that the courts are the proper forum to determine 
whether a dispute is arbitrable.191 The only claims Jacobs has agreed to arbitrate are those that it 
elects to have decided by arbitration.192 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that the right to decline arbitration shall only be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.193 
 
Jacko v. State, Pebble Ltd. Partnership 
In Jacko v. State, Pebble Ltd. Partnership, the supreme court held under the implied preemption 
standard, a state law conferring gatekeeper authority to a state department preempts an initiative 
granting a borough veto power.194 Lake and Peninsula Borough voters passed a law prohibiting 
mining activities with a negative impact on certain waters in the boroughs.195 The Alaska Land 
Act grants the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) authority on all matters impacting 
“exploration, development, and mining” of state resources.196 The lower court granted summary 
judgment for the state and enjoined the borough from enforcing the initiative.197 On appeal, 
Jacko argued that there is no express or implied preemption of the Borough’s authority to 
regulate the resources.198 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the 
Alaska Land Act granted gatekeeper authority to the state department, thereby preempting the 
Borough’s veto power. The supreme court reasoned that under the scheme proposed in the 
initiative, the DNR would no longer function as the sole gatekeeper in granting and denying 
mining permits and the Alaska Land Act impliedly preempted this power shift away from the 
DNR.199 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Alaska Land Act’s 
grant of gatekeeper authority to a state department implicitly preempted a Borough’s initiative-
derived authority over the same activities.200 
 
Manning v. State, Department of Fish & Game 
In Manning v. State, Department of Fish & Game,201 the supreme court held that attorneys’ fees 
cannot be awarded for work on procedural aspects of a constitutional lawsuit unless the fee 
applicant can prove the procedural work was solely related to a non-constitutional aspect of the 
lawsuit.202 In 2011, Kenneth Manning brought both statutory and constitutional claims in a 
lawsuit seeking to stop the Department of Fish & Game (“DF&G”) from instituting caribou 
hunting regulations.203 DF&G successfully defended the regulations and received summary 
judgment.204 DF&G was awarded attorney’s fees for time it spent working on procedural aspects 
of the lawsuit.205 On appeal, Manning argued that all aspects of the lawsuit involved 
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constitutional issues and thus he should not have to pay any attorneys’ fees.206 The supreme court 
vacated the lower court’s attorneys’ fees award, reasoning that DF&G could not get attorneys’ 
fees for work on procedural issues unless it could prove that work was not related to Manning’s 
constitutional claims.207 The court said that work done on the lawsuit’s procedural issues could 
not be distinguished from the constitutional claims involved in the lawsuit.208 The court further 
reasoned that the lower court should assume all procedural work done for the lawsuit related to 
constitutional claims, unless the DF&G could produce detailed documentation showing 
otherwise.209 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that attorneys’ fees 
cannot be awarded for work on procedural issues in a constitutional lawsuit unless the fee 
applicant can prove the procedural work was solely related to a non-constitutional aspect of the 
lawsuit.210 
 
Moore v. Olson 
In Moore v. Olson,211 the supreme court held that state courts are not required to sua sponte 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on arbitration awards and may confirm an award so long as there 
is no gross error.212 Aimee Moore and Donald Olson had personal and business relationships 
between 1995 and 2004, which included Moore managing Olson’s businesses for a share of the 
profits.213 Moore and Olson signed a final settlement agreement in 2005 to terminate their 
business relationship, under the condition that either party could arbitrate any future disputes and 
the losing party would pay costs and attorney’s fees.214 Moore initiated arbitration in 2012, 
arguing that Olson breached the settlement agreement in connection with the sale of two 
properties.215 The arbitrator decided that Olson did not breach the settlement agreement and he 
was awarded costs and attorney’s fees.216 The superior court confirmed this award, ruling that 
Olson was correctly granted costs and attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ arbitration 
agreement.217 On appeal, Moore argued that the superior court acted erroneously and violated her 
right to due process by ruling without holding a hearing.218 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that the arbitrator’s decisions were not gross error and there was no 
due process violation because the superior court was not obligated to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.219 The court noted that the arbitrator’s decisions complied with state arbitration statutes 
and were soundly justified, so the gross error standard was not met.220 The supreme court further 
noted that no statutes required a sua sponte evidentiary hearing and that Moore did not meet the 
plain error standard necessary to demonstrate that the lack of an evidentiary hearing violated due 
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process.221 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that state courts are not 
required to sua sponte conduct an evidentiary hearing on arbitration awards and may confirm an 
award so long as there is no gross error.222 
 
Patterson v. GEICO General Insurance Co. 
In Patterson v. GEICO General Insurance Co.,223 the supreme court affirmed all of the lower 
court’s rulings: denying the appellant’s motions to amend his complaint, awarding attorneys’ 
fees and costs to the appellee, as well as other procedural and evidentiary rulings.224 The 
appellant, Tommie Patterson, was injured in a hit-and-run accident in December 2009 and 
claimed that he was entitled to medical benefits for uninsured motorists through a provision in 
his General Insurance Company (“GEICO”) automobile insurance policy.225 Both parties 
disputed the severity of the injuries sustained in the accident.226 Patterson filed a complaint 
alleging breach of the insurance contract.227 Consequently, GEICO raised affirmative defense 
that Patterson’s injuries might have been a result of a pre-existing condition and that he was not 
entitled to recover for expenses already paid by his Medical Payments Coverage.228 The 
appellants attorney subsequently withdrew and Patterson proceeded with the litigation pro se, 
amending his complaint to include new claims of racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, and 
bad faith on the part of GEICO.229 The lower court denied Patterson’s motion to amend, finding 
it untimely and futile.230 Paterson further moved to disqualify the trial judge for bias and 
prejudice.231 The superior court denied Patterson’s motion and submitted the matter to another 
superior court judge for review where no basis for his claims was found.232 A pretrial conference 
was held in which Patterson agreed to follow the court’s orders to not pursue the claims in his 
amended complaint while in the presence of the jury and limit his evidence and arguments to the 
severity of the accident.233 The jury returned a verdict finding GEICO liable for $5,000 in past 
noneconomic damages and $10,000 in past medical expenses.234 Patterson motioned for a new 
trial and relief from judgment, alleging violation of his right to impartial judge and 
jury.235 GEICO moved for and prevailed on reduction in the verdict for medical expenses already 
paid on Patterson’s behalf, an entry of final judgment and recognition as the prevailing party, and 
for attorneys’ fees and costs under Alaska Civil Rule 68.236 As a result, the final net judgment in 
favor of Patterson was $1,556.75, that he appealed for abuse of discretion.237 Affirming the entire 
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judgment, the supreme court found no abuse in the lower court’s discretion, deeming all of the 
rulings reasonable.238 
 
Ray v. Draeger 
In Ray v. Draeger,239 the supreme court held that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude 
evidence of an expert witness’s substantial connection to the insurance industry.240 Draeger 
experienced and sought treatments for neck and back pain following an auto accident caused by 
Ray.241 Draeger sued Ray, defended by her insurance company, for damages relating to her 
medical care.242 At trial, the judge granted a motion to preclude any reference to the fact that Ray 
was covered by insurance.243 The order also limited questions on the bias of an expert witness 
retained by the insurance company to the scope of his work for defense attorneys, rather than for 
insurance companies.244 A jury awarded Draeger only some of her medical expenses based on 
testimony of the expert witness.245 Draeger appealed, arguing it was improper for the district 
court to preclude questions on the extent of the expert’s work for and payments from the 
insurance agencies.246 The superior court reversed the district court’s order which Ray 
appealed.247 Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the supreme court affirmed the conclusion of the 
superior court that the exclusion was improper.248 The supreme court reasoned that evidence of 
an expert witness’s substantial connection to the insurance industry, such as receiving a sizeable 
portion of income from insurance work, is relevant to bias and likely outweighs the danger of 
unfair prejudice under Alaska Evidence Rule 403 and 411.249 The supreme court held that 
exclusion of evidence not unfairly prejudicial of an expert witness’s substantial connection to the 
insurance industry constitutes abuse of discretion.250 
 
State v. W.P. 
In State v. W.P.,251 the court of appeals held that a trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the dollar amount of restitution owed by a juvenile delinquent and his mother, even 
after the juvenile completed his probation.252 W.P., a juvenile, admitted guilt for arson in 
November 2011, and accepted a plea bargain calling for one year of juvenile probation as well as 
restitution from both W.P. and his mother, A.P., with the amount to be determined later.253 The 
litigation of A.P.’s restitution obligation was repeatedly delayed throughout the following year, 
due to procedural errors in filing a restitution amount and difficulties in obtaining an attorney for 
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A.P.254 In February 2013, with W.P’s probation completed and a restitution amount still not filed, 
A.P. filed a motion contending that, under Alaska Statute 47.12.160, the superior court no longer 
had jurisdiction to enter restitution against her once W.P.’s probation ended.255 The superior 
court granted A.P.’s motion to dismiss the restitution proceedings.256 The court of appeals 
reversed the superior court, ruling that subsection (f) of Alaska Statute 47.12.160 strongly 
implies that a court retains subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an order fixing the dollar amount 
of restitution even after the court has lost its jurisdiction to alter other aspects of the delinquency 
judgment.257 The court of appeals held that a trial court retained subject-matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dollar amount of restitution owed by a juvenile delinquent and their parent, event 
after the juvenile completed probation.258 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Hughes v. Treadwell 
In Hughes v. Treadwell,259 the supreme court held that a ballot initiative requiring final 
legislative approval for large-scale mining operations within a watershed did not violate 
constitutional prohibitions on appropriation of state assets or on local or special legislation.260 In 
2012, Treadwell received and subsequently approved an initiative designed to protect the Bristol 
Bay Fisheries Reserve by requiring legislative approval for large-scale metallic sulfide mining 
operations within the Bristol Bay Fisheries Reserve watershed.261 Hughes brought forth a suit, 
challenging the constitutionality of the initiative, but the superior court ruled in favor of 
Treadwell, stating that the initiative was not unconstitutional.262 On appeal, Hughes argued that 
the ballot initiative violated constitutional prohibitions on appropriation, as well as on enacting 
local or special legislation by initiative.263 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the initiative did not violate the Alaska Constitution’s anti-appropriation 
clause because violations of the clause only occurred when voters effectively took over the 
legislature’s resource allocation role.264 In this case, the initiative still left the final decision over 
allocation of state assets to the legislature, therefore keeping the resource allocation role in the 
hands of the legislature.265 The court further reasoned that the initiative did not violate the Alaska 
Constitution’s local and special legislation clause because it bore a fair and substantial 
relationship to its legitimate purpose,266 since the initiative aimed to protect substantial biological 
and economic characteristics through legislative approval of potentially environmentally and 
economically harmful large-scale mining operations.267 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that a ballot initiative requiring final legislative approval for large-scale 
mining operations within a watershed did not violate constitutional prohibitions on appropriation 
of state assets or on local or special legislation.268 
 
Phillip v. State 
In Phillip v. State,269 the court of appeals held that the state constitution’s free exercise clause 
cannot provide an exemption from a religiously neutral law, when granting the exemption would 
harm a compelling state interest.270 David Phillip and twelve other Alaska Native subsistence 
fishermen sought a religious exemption under the free exercise clause after they were charged 
with violating the state’s emergency restrictions on king salmon fishing.271 The Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game put limits on fishing king salmon in the Kuskokwim River during 
the 2012 fishing season after estimating that the river’s king salmon population could fall to an 
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unsustainable level.272 On appeal, Phillip argued that he was fishing for king salmon based on 
traditional Yup’ik religious beliefs, and thus the state should find a less restrictive way to protect 
the king salmon population.273 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the king salmon and did not have 
to show that the emergency measures it used were the least restrictive available.274 The court of 
appeals found it sufficient that other potential emergency measures were not practical under the 
circumstances.275 The court further reasoned that the state only needed to show that its 
compelling interest would be harmed if it granted a religious exemption allowing Phillip to freely 
fish for king salmon.276 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the 
state constitution’s free exercise clause does not provide an exemption from a religiously neutral 
law when the exemption would harm a compelling state interest.277 
 
RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk 
In RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk,278 the supreme court held that a state constitutional due 
process claim against an administrative agency procedure requires exhaustion of available 
administrative remedies or, alternatively, a clear showing that administrative remedies would be 
manifestly futile.279 The Alaska Public Offices Commission (“Commission”) opened an 
investigation against RBG Bush Planes (“RBG”) alleging a violation of Alaska’s campaign 
finance laws.280 RBG subsequently brought state and federal due process claims against the 
Commission, alleging it was biased against him and seeking to enjoin it from being 
involved.281 The superior court found that the case lacked ripeness, because RBG failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies by pursuing the disqualification of certain officials he 
believed to be biased.282 The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that the statutory scheme had 
anticipated such an allegation by providing for a disqualification process.283 Further, the court 
reasoned that the process was not futile, because the Commission had not refused to address the 
bias contention.284 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a state due 
process claim against an administrative agency requires exhaustion of administrative remedies 
or, alternatively, a clear showing of manifest futility.285 
 
State v. Williams 
In State v. Williams,286 the court of appeals held as a matter of first impression that the authority 
to decide whether a charge of contempt should go forward to trial and judgment rests with the 
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judiciary.287 Williams was subpoenaed to appear and testify before an Anchorage grand jury in 
connection with a homicide, but failed to appear.288 The State obtained an arrest warrant, and, 
after he was eventually arrested, charged Williams with contempt for failing to honor the 
subpoena.289 The superior court dismissed the contempt charge, ruling that Williams had been 
the victim of selective prosecution.290 On appeal, the State argued that Alaska’s contempt statute 
requires courts to adjudicate all criminal contempt charges filed by the State.291 The court of 
appeals rejected the State’s argument and affirmed the lower court’s decision, albeit for different 
reasons.292 The court of appeals reasoned that the contempt power has traditionally been 
recognized as an inherent power of the judicial branch.293 Therefore, while the contempt statute 
may give the executive branch the authority to initiate a contempt charge, the ultimate authority 
to decide whether that charge should go forward—or not—rests with the court whose order has 
been violated.294 The State’s interpretation of the contempt statute would seriously shift the 
balance of power between the judicial and executive branches, circumscribing the former’s 
traditional authority over the final decision regarding who should be prosecuted for criminal 
contempt.295 The court of appeals reasoned that this radical result was likely unintended by the 
legislature in enacting the contempt statute.296 Affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the 
contempt charge, the court of appeals held that the authority to decide whether a charge of 
contempt should go forward to trial and judgment rests with the judiciary.297 
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CONTRACT LAW 
 
Duenas-Rendon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
In Duenas-Rendon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A,298 the supreme court held that no additional notice 
is due to a borrower when a lender has provided notice of default and intention to foreclose, even 
if the lender continues accepting payments after a notice of default.299 When Duenas-Rendon 
failed to make her mortgage payments, Wells Fargo apprised her that her loan was in default and 
that the bank intended to accelerate and foreclose.300 Two months later, a notice of default was 
recorded stating the bank’s intention to foreclose and auction the house, and, for the next few 
months, the bank continued accepting payments from Duenas-Rendon and holding them in 
suspension.301 After the auction of her house, Duenas-Rendon sued, alleging that the bank’s 
continued acceptance of payments after recording a notice of default, without providing 
additional notice of its continued intention to foreclose, resulted in a waiver of its right to 
foreclose.302 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior court, finding that notice had 
been properly given before the loan was accelerated, and that the bank’s later conduct in 
accepting payments did not cause an implied waiver.303 The court reasoned that implied waiver 
was absent because, first, the loan documents provided for all of the bank’s actions, making the 
conduct consistent with the bank’s legal rights, and, second, the bank’s conduct was objectively 
consistent with maintaining exercise of its contractual rights and did not amount to 
estoppel.304 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a bank can proceed with a 
foreclosure when it provides initial notice of default and intention to accelerate, and does not 
impliedly waive its right to foreclose.305 
 
Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC 
In Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC,306 the supreme court held that a holder in due course is immune 
from a borrower’s incapacity defense because incapacity results in a voidable, not void, 
contractual obligation.307 In March 2000, Gregory Erkins was in a car accident and began taking 
strong pain medication for his injuries.308 Erkins took out a loan from Ameriquest in 2004, which 
was secured by a property he owned, and then used the same property to secure a second loan 
from Ameriquest.309 JPMorgan Chase Bank purchased the loan from Ameriquest in 2005 and the 
loan was assigned to the Bank of New York.310 The loan fell into delinquency and Bank of New 
York began foreclosure proceedings, which prompted Erkins to sue Alaska Trustee, Bank of 
New York, and JP Morgan for fraud and misrepresentation of the loan terms.311 The superior 
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, arguing that the defendants could not be 
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liable for the alleged torts of Ameriquest, but the supreme court initially ruled that summary 
judgment was not appropriate and remanded.312 The superior court again granted summary 
judgment and Erkins appealed, arguing that he was incapacitated when he entered into the 
contract.313 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that since 
incapacity only results in a voidable contract, a holder in due course is immune from an 
incapacity defense.314 The court noted that incapacity during contract formation only renders a 
contract voidable, not void, so Erkins’ loan is not automatically void.315 The court determined 
that the Bank of New York took Erkins’ loan before default, without any knowledge of his 
alleged incapacity, and was therefore a holder in due course.316 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that a holder in due course is immune from a borrower’s 
incapacity defense because incapacity results in a voidable, not void, contractual obligation.317 
 
Lybourn v. City of Wasilla 
In Lybourn v. City of Wasilla,318 the supreme court held an easement agreement with the phrase 
“subject to” to be unambiguously conditional. Property owners granted a utility easement to the 
City in exchange for City building an access road across the property, upon obtaining necessary 
permits and funding.319 The City installed water and sewer lines in the granted easement, but did 
not fulfill all the conditions of the easement agreement.320 The lower court held the easement 
expressly conditioned construction of the access road upon available funding and obtaining a 
wetlands permit, which did not occur despite the City’s reasonable efforts.321 On appeal, the 
property owners argued that the City’s failure to apply for a wetlands permit and to construct the 
access road breach the terms of the agreement.322 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the ordinary and common meaning of “subject to” used in the contract is 
unambiguous as imposing a condition precedent on a party’s duty to perform.323 Additionally, 
looking at the negotiations and expectations of the parties, it is clear that the property owners 
agreed to this exchange.324 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held the 
phrase “subject to” to be unambiguously conditional. 
 
Mahan v. Mahan 
In Mahan v. Mahan,325 the supreme court held that a contractual term could be interpreted using 
the plain language of the provision and factual findings of the trial court, including extrinsic 
evidence.326 The Mahan’s marriage dissolution included a provision to temporarily split the 
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profits, minus the fuel cost and cannery dues, of their commercial fishing boat.327 Ms. Mahan 
filed a motion to enforce the dissolution agreement, alleging Mr. Mahan’s failed to pay her the 
2011 commercial fishing profits.328 Following an evidentiary hearing, the master concluded Mr. 
Mahan owed Ms. Mahan half of the 2011 commercial fishing income.329 Mr. Mahan objected to 
that interpretation of profits, alleging instead that only the positive income remaining after 
paying expenses qualified. The superior court disagreed with Mr. Mahan’s 
interpretation.330 Subsequently, in 2013, Ms. Mahan filed suit again, seeking the 2012 profits and 
remainder of the 2011 profits, and Mr. Mahan cross-motioned for a judgment against her for the 
commercial fishing losses incurred in 2011 and 2012.331 The magistrate found the dissolution 
contract lacked evidence supporting Mr. Mahan’s interpretation of profits, and the superior court 
approved, defining profits as income minus fuel cost and dues.332 On appeal, the supreme court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Ms. Mahan, reasoning that the lower court 
properly relied on both the contract language and extrinsic evidence to determine whether the 
term profits was ambiguous.333 The supreme court determined that the plain language of the 
provision, read as a whole, together with extrinsic evidence about the intention of the contract, 
supported the lower court’s interpretation.334 In seeking to give effect to the parties’ reasonable 
expectations at the time of agreement, the supreme court affirmed the lower court’s holding, 
finding that the plain meaning of a contract provision and in addition to accompanying factual 
and extrinsic evidence govern the interpretation of a contractual term.335 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Adams v. State 
In Adams v. State, the court of appeals held jury instructions adequately convey the requirement 
of proximate causation even if they state that a controlled substance need not be the sole cause of 
a driver’s impaired performance.336 After multiple individuals called 911 to report Adams’ 
erratic driving, the defendant was pulled over and arrested. Adams told the officer he was tired 
and claimed that this was the cause of his erratic driving.337 Adams objected o the jury 
instruction that explained that the use of a controlled substance need not be the only cause of the 
impaired driving.338 On appeal, the defendant argued that the statute under which he was charged 
requires the state to prove that a defendant’s impairment is attributable solely to the ingestion of 
controlled substances.339 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
the defendant’s interpretation would create a defense inconsistent with the purpose of the 
statute.340 The court reasoned that under Alaska law, a person’s conduct is the proximate cause of 
a result in two circumstances: 1) the result would not have occurred “but for” the conduct and 2) 
the conduct was “so important” in bringing about the result that “reasonable individuals would 
regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it.”341 Under the defendant’s interpretation, 
defendants who could convince a jury that another factor, such as exhaustion, augmented their 
impairment would be entitled to an acquittal on a DUI charge.342 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held jury instructions adequately convey the requirements for a 
DUI charge when the judge instructs that a controlled substance need not be the only cause of a 
driver’s impaired performance.343 
 
Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage 
In Alaska Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage,344 the 
supreme court held that the state’s Public Defender Act enabling statute (AS 18.85.100(a)) does 
not authorize the appointment of the Alaska Public Defender Agency (“the Agency”) to serve as 
“standby” counsel in criminal cases where the defendants have waived their constitutional right 
to counsel and have chosen to represent themselves.345 In this case, the defendant, Grant 
Matthisen, is charged with two counts of criminal non-support.346 As an indigent, Matthisen 
qualifies for the appointment of counsel at public expense but has chosen to waive this right and 
to represent himself.347 Regardless, the superior court appointed the Agency to “act in a 
consultative capacity” better known as “standby” counsel for Matthisen.348 The Agency objected 
to the appointment and argued that the superior court acted beyond the scope permitted by the 
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enabling statute.349 The superior court disagreed on the grounds that the appointment was within 
the scope of the Agency’s authority and supported by considerations of fairness and due 
process.350 The supreme court reasoned that AS 18.85.100(a) does not authorize the appointment 
of standby counsel because in such a capacity the Agency does not “represent” the defendant–the 
impetus behind the statute and vacated the superior court’s order.351 Additionally, the supreme 
court noted that requiring the Agency to provide unwanted “standby” counsel to indigent 
defendants misallocates scarce resources that might be sought by indigents actually desiring 
representation by the Agency.352 Vacating the superior court’s order, the supreme court held that 
the Public Defender Act does not authorize the appointment of an Agency attorney as standby 
counsel for a defendant that has decided to represent his or her self.353 
 
Alexiadis v. State 
In Alexiadis v. State,354 the court of appeals held that a trial court cannot reject a plea agreement 
as too lenient when the State has agreed not to raise aggravating sentencing factors requiring a 
jury trial.355 The defendant was charged with three counts of second-degree assault.356 The 
defendant and the State reached a plea agreement where the defendant agreed to plead guilty to 
one of the counts and the State, in turn, agreed to dismiss the other two charges and not pursue 
any aggravating sentencing factors.357 After reviewing the presentence report, the superior court 
rejected the plea agreement as too lenient, because not raising aggravating factors limited 
sentencing to one to three years.358 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that the state has the 
authority to decide whether to litigate aggravating factors when they must be proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.359 The court noted that the judiciary has no authority to force 
prosecutors to litigate these factors.360 Reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held 
that, with respect to aggravating sentencing factors requiring a jury trial, the executive branch 
has the sole discretion whether or not to litigate or refrain from litigating them.361 
 
Beasley v. State 
 In Beasley v. State,362 the court of appeals held that it was within a trial court’s broad discretion 
to impose a longer sentence than that recommended in a presentence report.363 Beasley pleaded 
guilty to a charge of possession of child pornography.364 Weighing several mitigating factors, 
Beasley’s presentence report recommended the statutory minimum sentence of four years with 
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two years suspended.365 Nevertheless, the superior court sentenced Beasley to six years with 
three years suspended, plus five years of probation.366 On appeal, Beasley argued that as a 
youthful offender with no prior record, a history of post-arrest cooperation, and an endorsement 
of good rehabilitative prospects in his presentence report, he instead merited the statutory 
minimum.367 The court of appeals reasoned that excessive sentence claims are reviewed under a 
deferential clearly-mistaken standard.368 While another judge might have validly concluded 
Beasley was a good candidate for the minimum sentence based on his presentence report, the 
court reasoned, here the sentencing judge had not been shown to be clearly mistaken in placing 
greater emphasis on the gravity and depravity of Beasley’s crime.369 Affirming the lower court, 
then, the court of appeals held that it was within a trial court’s broad discretion to impose a 
longer sentence than that recommended in a presentence report.370 
 
Bochkovsky v. State 
In Bochkovsky v. State,371 the court of appeals held that the reasonable suspicion standard 
requires evidence separating a package from a group of packages, which may be demonstrated 
by, in addition to physical mailing details of a package, evidence of a fictitious 
name.372 Bochkovsky was convicted in a jury trial of misconduct involving a controlled 
substance after being caught with a package that state troopers had previously searched based on 
their assessment that the package was reasonably suspicious.373 The troopers noted several 
indicia supporting their decision to search the package prior to delivery, including the mailing 
location, price paid to mail, handwritten label, and a possible fictitious name.374 Bochkovsky 
appealed, alleging in part that the troopers lacked reasonable suspicion of the package.375 On 
appeal, the court of appeals affirmed that the troopers had satisfied the reasonable suspicion 
standard.376 Specifically, the reasonable suspicion standard required evidence of a fictitious name 
because that served as a unique characteristic outside of physical mailing details which might 
match innocent packages; this discovery was objectively supported by a fruitless search in a 
statewide database.377 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that the reasonable 
suspicion standard is met when evidence separates a package from other packages, in particular 
by discovering evidence of a fictitious name, in addition to other suspicious physical details.378 
 
Byford v. State 
In Byford v. State,379 the court of appeals held that in order to convict a defendant of scheme to 
defraud, a jury does not have to unanimously agree on whether a defendant’s scheme was 
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intended to defraud five or more people, or to fraudulently obtain $10,000 or more.380 After 
defrauding nine people by making false promises to build log homes, and obtaining hundreds of 
thousands of dollars from his victims, a jury found Byford guilty of three offenses, including 
scheme to defraud.381 Citing state statute, the lower court noted that a person commits this crime 
if he engages in conduct constituting a scheme to either (1) defraud five or more persons by 
fraudulent pretense, or (2) defraud one or more persons of $10,000 or more by fraudulent 
pretense.382 When the superior court judge at Byford’s trial instructed the jury on the elements of 
scheme to defraud, he told the jurors that they did not have to reach unanimous agreement as to 
whether the State had proved element (1) or (2).383 Byford appealed, arguing that this instruction 
constituted plain error, depriving him of his right to a unanimous verdict by allowing the jury to 
convict him even if it did not unanimously agree on the type of scheme in which Byford 
engaged.384 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that 
while Alaska law requires jury unanimity regarding the conduct that forms the basis of the 
criminal conviction, a jury does not necessarily need to be unanimous regarding a 
defendant’s intention.385 Where, as in this case, a criminal statute gives a menu of purposes 
defining a defendant’s aims (to defraud five or more people or fraudulently obtain $10,000 or 
more) but not defining his conduct (defined by the statute exclusively as engaging in conduct 
constituting a scheme),386 the court of appeals found that a trial court does not err in instructing 
jurors that they do not have to unanimously agree on the defendant’s intention.387 Thus, 
affirming the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals held that in order to convict a defendant 
of scheme to defraud, a jury does not have to unanimously agree on whether a defendant’s 
scheme was intended to defraud five or more people, or to fraudulently obtain $10,000 or 
more.388 
 
George v. State 
 In George v. State,389 the supreme court held that evidence before the jury must describe with 
sufficient specificity the kinds of act or acts committed, the number of acts committed, and the 
general time period wherein these acts occurred.390 Kelsey George was convicted of 10 counts of 
sexual abuse.391 At issue is Count Ten, where George was charged with digital penetration 
during the victims third-grade year.392 At the trial, the victim could not state specifically when 
the abuse happened, only that it started when she was four years old and that by the time she was 
in fourth-grade George had engaged in penis-to-vagina penetration.393 The jury found George 
guilty on Count Ten as well as all other counts but one.394 George appealed the conviction of 
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Count Ten to the court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction.395 On appeal, George argued 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on Count Ten, as a sexual abuse case 
requires evidence showing a particular type of conduct occurred within a time frame.396 The 
supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the State failed to provide 
sufficient evidence about the regularity and the timing of the digital penetration such that the jury 
could find that George had digitally penetrated her during third grade.397 The court reasoned that 
though the state provided evidence that George digitally penetrated the victim during her fourth-
grade year, they did not provide evidence of a specific instance of such conduct during her third-
grade year.398 Reversing and remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
evidence before the jury must describe with sufficient specificity the kinds of act or acts 
committed, the number of acts committed, and the general time period these acts occurred.399 
 
Gibson v. State 
In Gibson v. State,400 the supreme court held that conduct occurring during immediate flight from 
a robbery is included within the scope of second-degree robbery.401 Gibson was the get-away 
driver in the robbery of a donation jar from a coffee shop counter, an act immediately noticed by 
the shop owner and her daughter.402 The two women immediately ran to Gibson’s vehicle and 
told her not to leave.403 Instead, Gibson drove away while the women were holding onto the 
vehicle, causing them to sustain minor injuries.404 Gibson was convicted at trial of second-degree 
robbery.405 Gibson’s appeal argued that she should have been liable, at most, for third-degree 
robbery because her use of force occurred after the donation jar had already been taken from the 
presence and control of the shop owner, rather than in the course of the taking.406 The supreme 
court affirmed the conviction because the statutory definition includes force used to overcome 
resistance after the taking as within the scope of second-degree robbery, and because the 
legislative history of the statute indicated that the legislature intended to expand the definition of 
robbery.407 The supreme court held that conduct occurring during immediate flight from a 
robbery is included within the scope of second-degree robbery.408 
 
Glasgow v. State 
In Glasgow v. State,409 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant’s due process right to 
present his case did not entitle him to jury instructions on matters that did not relate to any 
legally cognizable defense or any disputed facts in the case.410 In August 2011, Michael Glasgow 
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was riding his bike on a bike path in Homer when Timothy Whitehead and his son walked past 
Glasgow with two unleashed dogs.411 One of the dogs approached Glasgow, who pulled out a 
knife and jabbed it at the animal.412 Glasgow then continued riding down the path, yelling at 
Whitehead to put his dogs on a leash.413 Whitehead and Glasgow then engaged in a verbal 
altercation, and Glasgow walked back toward Whitehead still holding a knife in his 
hand.414 Glasgow was indicted and convicted of third-degree assault.415 At the start of Glasgow’s 
trial, defense counsel asked the court for jury instructions on Homer code provisions concerning 
the control of animals, and state statutes authorizing the killing of a dog running at large.416 The 
trial court refused defense counsel’s request.417 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling, reasoning that the laws Glasgow cited do not authorize attacking a dog’s owner when he 
is trying to restrain his animals, and thus were not applicable to the controversy in 
question.418 The court of appeals held that a criminal defendant’s due process right to present his 
case did not entitle him to jury instructions on matters that did not relate to any legally 
cognizable defense or any disputed facts in the case.419 
 
Goldsbury v. State 
In Goldsbury v. State,420 the supreme court held that if a constitutional error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, reversal of a conviction is not warranted.421 After a dispute at a motel, 
Goldsbury fired a round of bird shot through the door of his motel room, injuring Marvin 
Long.422 Long testified before the jury, but Goldsbury chose not to testify.423 During her closing 
argument rebuttal, the prosecutor commented that two people knew what happened but only the 
victim testified.424 Subsequently, Goldsbury was convicted of attempted murder in the first 
degree, assault in the second degree, recklessly firing a gun at a building, and criminal mischief 
in the fourth degree.425 Goldsbury appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s comment violated his 
state and federal rights against self-incrimination.426 The court of appeals found that Goldsbury 
did not preserve his argument for appeal by objecting to the comment at trial and there was no 
plain error.427 Goldsbury petitioned the supreme court for review on the question of whether the 
comment constituted plain error.428 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling 
that the prosecutor’s error did not constitute plain error.429 The court noted that the comment was 
indeed a violation of Goldsbury’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, but held that 
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prejudice is the key factor in plain error review, and a constitutional violation is not prejudicial if 
the State proves it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.430 The court reasoned that any harm 
from the prosecutor’s comment was insignificant, isolated, and cured by the jury instructions on 
Goldsbury’s right not to testify.431 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held 
that if a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal of a conviction is not 
warranted.432 
 
Hutton v. State 
In Hutton v. State,433 the supreme court held that appellate courts reviewing the validity of a 
waiver of the right to jury trial must review relevant factual findings for clear error and the 
ultimate conclusion regarding the waiver’s validity de novo.434 Hutton was on trial for weapons 
misconduct in the third degree for being a felon in possession of a concealable firearm.435 The 
jury found the first element by special interrogatory—Hutton knowingly possessed a 
firearm.436 The court subsequently accepted Hutton’s in-court admission of the second element—
he was a prior felon—and waived his right to trial on that element.437 He was then convicted and 
sentenced.438 On appeal, Hutton argued he had not knowingly waived his right to a jury trial on 
that element.439 The supreme court reasoned that a whether a defendant made a constitutionally 
valid waiver is a mixed question of law and fact.440 Reviewing the facts for clear error, the court 
found that Hutton was not advised of a third element of his charge—a culpable mental state for 
his status as a felon.441 Due to this incomplete and misleading information, the supreme court 
reversed the lower courts and found Hutton’s jury waiver constitutionally defective.442 The 
supreme court held that appellate courts reviewing the validity of a waiver of the right to jury 
trial must review relevant factual findings for clear error and the ultimate conclusion regarding 
the waiver’s validity de novo.443 
 
Lenz v. State 
In Lenz v. State,444 the court of appeals held a defendant’s equal protection rights are not violated 
when a codefendant receives a more favorable offer in plea bargaining.445 In May 2012, Anthony 
Lenz and Glen Anderkay burglarized and vandalized an Anchorage laundromat.446 Both men 
were initially charged with two felonies and one count of misdemeanor theft, but were offered 
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different plea bargains.447 Although Anderkay was allowed to plead guilty to two misdemeanors, 
the State insisted that Lenz plead guilty to one of the felony charges.448 Lenz rejected the State’s 
offer, and was convicted at trial of both felony counts.449 On appeal, Lenz argued that the State 
violated his constitutional right to equal protection by refusing to offer him the same plea bargain 
that Anderkay received.450 Although the State conceded the two men played equal roles in the 
charged criminal behavior, the superior court ruled the State did not violate Lenz’s right to equal 
protection because Lenz’s criminal record was substantially worse than Anderkay’s.451 The court 
of appeals affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the State has broad discretion to 
decide the terms on which it is willing to resolve charges brought against a criminal defendant 
prior to trial, and that the State had articulable grounds for treating Lenz and Anderkay 
differently.452 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the court of appeals held a defendant’s 
equal protection rights are not violated when a codefendant receives a more favorable offer in 
plea bargaining.453 
 
McGowen v. State 
In McGowen v. State,454 the supreme court held that the defendant’s conviction for three counts 
related to possession and manufacturing of marijuana had to be merged because it would run 
afoul of double jeopardy to be held liable for three charges arising out of the same act.455 In 
March 2006, Alaska State Troopers charged Gerald McGowen with four counts of misconduct 
involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree after executing a search warrant in his 
house and seizing 26 plants, three baggies of marijuana weighing 11.2 grams, and equipment 
used in the growing marijuana.456 At McGowen’s sentencing the superior court merged the 
fourth count with the other three, leaving Counts I, II and III as separate 
convictions.457 McGowen appealed his convictions on various grounds but he did not argue that 
the three convictions should be merged and as a result the court affirmed them separate 
convictions.458 On petition, McGowen argued under the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska 
Constitution that his three convictions should be merged because they were based on the same 
underlying conduct.459 The supreme court held that the three counts must be merged, because 
they were based on the same underlying conduct.460 The supreme court reasoned that it is 
impermissible to impose separate convictions for possessing a drug with intent to sell and simply 
possessing the drug.461 The supreme court further reasoned that there was no reason to 
distinguish between the act of growing marijuana and possessing the same marijuana once it was 
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grown, therefore it is appropriate to merge the separate convictions for both acts.462 Reversing 
the lower court’s separate convictions, the supreme court held that a defendant’s convictions for 
three counts related to possession and manufacturing of marijuana should be merged when they 
arise out of the same substantive act. 
 
Moreno v. State 
In Moreno v. State,463 the supreme court held that a defendant does not have the burden to prove 
that his or her attorney’s non-objection to errors was not tactical.464 The supreme court 
consolidated the petitions of the defendants, Moreno and Hicks, both of whom were separately 
convicted for different crimes after their respective counsels failed to object to errors at 
trial.465 Both appealed, seeking plain error review, but the court of appeals held that the 
defendants failed to show that the error was not the result of defense counsel’s tactical decision 
to not object, thus precluding plain error review.466 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decisions, citing precedent showing that evidence of tactical non-objection to a trial 
error must be plainly obvious from the record to persuade an appellate court that a defendant’s 
otherwise meritorious claim of error should not trigger appellate review;467 and further showing 
that the a defendant does not bear the burden of proving that such error was not the result of 
one’s attorney’s tactical decision to not object.468 Noting a lack of such plainly obvious tactical 
decision-making in both cases, the supreme court went on to reason that the court of appeals first 
erred in presuming that the silent or ambiguous record of defendants’ counsels implied a tactical 
decision to not object, and ultimately erred in placing the burden of negating this inference on 
the defendants.469 Reversing the lower court’s decisions, the supreme court held that a defendant 
does not have the burden to prove that his or her attorney’s non-objection to errors was not 
tactical.470 
 
Murray v. State 
In Murray v. State,471 the court of appeals held that counsel for a man who had a history of 
mental illness rendered effective pre-plea assistance, even though she failed to stop the man from 
making a plea against his best interests.472 In 2007, Murray was charged with two counts of first-
degree sexual assault.473 Subsequently, the State offered him two favorable plea bargains, both of 
which Murray’s attorney (Murphy) advised him to accept, but both of which he 
declined.474 Murphy made a third plea bargain, but Murray refused again, and instead proposed a 
less favorable one of his own, which the court accepted.475 In 2009, Murray brought forth relief 
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proceedings, arguing that Murphy did not represent him competently.476 The lower court ruled in 
favor of Murphy, dismissing Murray’s petition for post-conviction relief.477 On appeal, Murray 
argued that Murphy had been under an ethical duty to prevent him from entering his guilty plea, 
due to her awareness of Murray’s mental impairment.478 The court of appeals affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, reasoning that, as according to the Alaska Professional Conduct Rules, Murphy 
rendered adequate assistance.479 The court of appeals found that Murphy complied with the 
Conduct Rules since she hired a mental health professional to counsel Murray.480 Additionally, 
the court reasoned that although Murray was mentally impaired, he himself admitted that he was 
not incompetent to make decisions about the plea bargain, and so Murphy was required to honor 
Murray’s desired plea bargain.481 The court also noted that Murphy made many attempts to 
dissuade Murray from making an unfavorable plea bargain.482 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the court of appeals held that an attorney rendered effective pre-plea assistance for a 
client who had a history of mental illness, even though the attorney failed to stop the client from 
making a plea against his best interests.483 
 
Noble v. State 
In Noble v. State,484 the court held that a motorist’s failure to use a turn signal when entering and 
exiting a roundabout is not a traffic infraction justifying a stop by police officers.485 On 
November 1, 2010, University of Alaska Fairbanks campus police received a report of a reckless 
driver in a dark-colored Toyota.486 Subsequently, the campus police found a vehicle matching the 
description in a campus parking lot and kept it under surveillance when they saw Donald Noble 
enter the vehicle and start driving.487 The police officers followed Noble and pulled him over for 
two traffic infractions when he failed to use his turn signal upon entering and leaving a 
roundabout.488 During the stop, the police discovered that Noble had been drinking and he was 
convicted for felony driving under the influence, the superior court did not rule on the legality of 
the traffic infraction.489 On appeal, Noble challenged the legality of the traffic stop.490 The court 
held that the law is unclear about the application of 13 AAC 02.2014—requiring the use of a 
signal 100 feet before turning left or right with regards to roundabouts.491 In doing so, the court 
reasoned that it is unclear whether the act of entering or exiting a roundabout constitutes a right 
turn and sought clarification from either the legislature or Department of Public 
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Safety.492 Reversing the lower court, the court held that a motorist does not commit a traffic 
infraction when failing to use a turn signal while entering or exiting a roundabout.493 
 
Olson v. State 
 In Olson v. State,494 the court of appeals ruled that a prosecutor did not commit misconduct 
when he referred to the jurors by their names during his closing argument.495 In October 2012, an 
Alaskan state trooper intercepted Olson at an airport based off of a tip that said she was planning 
to import drugs and alcohol into a local dry community.496 Upon inspection of Olson’s bag, the 
trooper found alcohol and marijuana, and she was subsequently charged with importation of 
alcoholic beverages into a local option community, as well as misconduct involving a controlled 
substance.497 At Olson’s trial, the jury convicted Olson of importation, and she was sentenced to 
eighty-nine days in jail, with nine days to serve, along with a fine.498 On appeal, Olson argued 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument when he referred to each 
juror by name.499 The court of appeals held that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, 
stating first that this was an issue of first impression for Alaska, and that there were no prior 
cases approving or disapproving of the use of jurors’ names in trial.500 The court’s analysis then 
began by looking to other jurisdictions, which mostly held that such a practice was frowned 
upon.501 The court differentiated these cases from the one at hand, however, because those cases 
generally were concerned with when attorneys singled out individual jurors to play to the other 
jurors’ sympathies.502 The court then said that while the prosecutor did single out an individual 
juror in this case, he did so in a benign way, doing mostly for the purposes of explaining 
hypotheticals and making metaphors.503 The court finally mentioned that, in the other 
jurisdictions, it was rare for a court to reverse a conviction upon such an error, and that while 
they frowned upon the practice of calling each juror by their name, there was no real reason to 
believe that such conduct was in plain error.504 Upholding the jury verdict, the court of appeals 
ruled that a prosecutor did not commit misconduct when he referred to the jurors by their names 
during his closing argument.505 
 
Ramsey v. State 
In Ramsey v. State,506 the court of appeals held that a trial court’s failure to instruct jurors that 
they must be factually unanimous as to which acts a criminal defendant committed was not 
harmless error.507 Ramsey was convicted by a jury of second-degree theft based on evidence that 
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she stole a variety of items from her employer on different days.508 At trial, the judge declined 
defense counsel’s request to instruct jurors that they had to unanimously agree on which of the 
alleged thefts Ramsey committed.509 On appeal, the court of appeals cited precedent showing that 
when the State presents evidence that a defendant committed multiple different acts that could 
each support a criminal conviction, the court is still required to instruct the jury that it must be 
factually unanimous as to which acts the defendant actually committed.510 This requirements 
holds even when, as here, the State charges a defendant with a higher degree of theft based on a 
connected series of smaller-value thefts: the jury’s verdict must still be based on jurors’ 
unanimous agreement as to which of the individual thefts the defendant committed.511 Moreover, 
the failure to give to give such a unanimity instruction is plain error requiring reversal, unless the 
State can show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (here, the State conceded 
the trial judge’s failure to provide the instruction was error).512 Accordingly, reversing the lower 
court, the court of appeals held that a trial court’s failure to instruct jurors that they must be 
factually unanimous as to which acts a criminal defendant committed was not harmless error.513 
 
Selvester v. State 
In Selvester v. State, the court of appeals held that a separate habeas corpus claim will not be 
entertained when relief is available using normal court or appellate procedures.514 While awaiting 
trial for sexual assault charges, Selvester filed a pro se habeas corpus claim, raising a speedy trial 
claim that could have been raised in his pending criminal case.515 Instead of dismissing the claim 
and directing him to pursue the habeas corpus claim in his criminal trial, the superior court 
denied the petition on its merits.516 On appeal, the court of appeals found that the lower court 
erred in reviewing the habeas corpus claim on its merits, where the petitioner could have raised 
the claim in his pending criminal case.517 The court of appeals reasoned that habeas corpus is an 
extraordinary remedy.518 It thus reasoned that the superior court should have dismissed the case 
and not litigated it on the merits when there was alternative remedy available through the 
criminal trial court.519 The court of appeals held that habeas corpus is available if relief can be 
found using normal court or appellate procedures.520 
 
Shayen v. State 
In Shayen v. State,521 the court of appeals held a statute requiring sex offenders to notify 
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) whenever they change their residence was not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who was not personally affected by potential 
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difficulties in defining the word “residence.”522 The statute does not contain a definition of 
“residence.”523 However, DPS employees adopted an ad hoc definition that tailored to the 
situation of homeless offenders by allowing them to identify a place they are staying with as 
much detail as reasonably possible.524 DPS allowed the defendant to file his change of residence 
citing a shelter, a café, and a campsite.525 On appeal, the defendant argued that the statute fails to 
give homeless sex offenders adequate notice of when they must report a change of location 
because they, by definition, lack a residence.526 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s 
decision, reasoning that the defendant benefited from DPS’ approach.527 DPS repeatedly 
accepted the defendant’s forms with varying amounts of specificity, and the defendant never 
asserted that he was personally affected by the difficulties in defining “residence.”528 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held the statute requiring sex offenders to notify 
DPS whenever they change residence was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the 
defendant. 
 
Sickel v. State 
 In Sickel v. State,529 the court of appeals held that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) criminalizing cruelty to 
animals through criminal neglect applies to people who have assumed responsibility for the care 
of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise.530 Robin Lee Sickel and Jeff Waldroupe owned 
three horses and kept them on land owned by Waldroupe’s father.531 In mid-December 2010, the 
horses were found starving and without shelter, the only food and water available to them was 
frozen solid.532 One of the horses had to be euthanized because it was more than 200 pounds 
underweight and had collapsed on the ground.533 Sickel was convicted of cruelty to animals 
under AS 11.61.140(a) and appealed the conviction, claiming that because the statute fails to 
define who bears a duty to care for animals, that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and that 
her conviction is therefore unlawful.534 The court acknowledged that although the statute fails to 
specify which persons have a duty to care for particular animals, the underlying aim of the 
statute is to protect animals from serious neglect by the people who have assumed responsibility 
for their care.535 The court reasoned that the real inquiry in the statute is not to identify persons 
who have legal ownership of the animal, but rather to determine the persons who have taken on 
the duty of caring for them.536 Sickel’s attorney never contested that she had assumed the 
responsibility of caring for the horses, rather she claimed that the Jeff Waldroupe and his father 
had also assumed responsibility.537 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that 
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subsection (a)(2) of the cruelty to animals statute applies to people who have assumed 
responsibility for the care of an animal, either as an owner or otherwise.538 
 
Simmons v. State 
In Simmons v. State,539 the court of appeals held it was unlawful for a trial court to grant a 
prosecutor unilateral power to decide whether a defendant should be released on bail pending 
appeal.540 Simmons was convicted of fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct, and 
sentenced to 42 months in prison, with 12 months suspended.541 His attorney asked the court to 
stay the sentence for 30 days to give Simmons time to file an appeal.542 The sentencing judge 
told the parties he would only grant the stay if the prosecutor stipulated to Simmons’ bail 
release.543 The prosecutor did not stipulate to Simmons’ release, and the sentencing judge 
remanded Simmons to custody.544 The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, 
reasoning that the judge’s ruling violated Alaska Statute 12.30.040(a).545, 546 The statute provides 
that defendants are entitled to post-conviction bail if they establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that they can be released under conditions that will assure their appearance and the 
safety of the community.547 The court of appeals determined that the sentencing judge, in 
declaring that Simmons would be remanded to custody unless the prosecutor stipulated to his 
release on bail, unlawfully granted unilateral power to the prosecutor to decide whether Simmons 
would be released or jailed.548 Reversing the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals held it 
was unlawful for a trial court to grant a prosecutor unilateral power to decide whether a 
defendant should be released on bail pending appeal.549 
 
Simon v. State 
In Simon v. State,550 the court of appeals held that, in the context of a modern retail store, a theft 
is not complete until a person exceeds the scope of possession granted to customers by the 
storeowner.551 While shopping at a large retail store, Harold Simon hid several items on his 
person and proceeded to pay for only a few smaller items at the checkout counter.552 Simon was 
stopped by one of the store’s employees while attempting to leave the store.553 After the items 
were discovered, Simon was charged with second-degree theft.554 At trial, the jury sent a note to 
the judge asking whether Simon could rightfully be held to have exerted control over the 
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property if he was caught in the vestibule of the store.555 The judge instructed the jury to look at 
the matter of control without regard to any particular area of the store where he was 
apprehended, and the jury proceeded to convict Simon.556 On appeal, the court addressed 
whether the lower court judge erred by instructing the jury that the area where the defendant was 
apprehended in a retail store where customers are allowed to possess items within the store does 
not matter.557 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that Simon had 
clearly gone beyond the scope of possession granted to a customer when he had taken a number 
of items beyond the checkout counter and was heading for the door.558 The court of appeals 
further reasoned that while physical location within a store when apprehended may be relevant in 
some instances, the variation between Simon and the State’s version of evidence were irrelevant, 
because, regardless, Simon’s possession of the merchandise exceeded the scope of possession 
granted to customers.559 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that, in 
the context of a modern retail store, a theft is not complete until a person exceeds the scope of 
possession granted to customers by the storeowner.560 
 
Smith v. State 
In Smith v. State, the court of appeals held a 72-year suspended sentence for possession of child 
pornography outside of the range of permissible reasonable sentences given the typical nature of 
the defendant’s actions for the specific crime, despite the court’s goals of deterrence and 
community condemnation.561 Alaska State Troopers arrested the defendant for downloading 
child pornography over the Internet.562 At his sentencing hearing, the defendant submitted a sex-
offender risk assessment that indicated that he appeared amenable to sex-offender treatment and 
community supervision, though the report also indicated a high risk of reoffending.563 As a first 
felony offender, the defendant faced a range of 2 to 12 years on each of the convictions and 
suspended time on each conviction, in addition to at least 5 years probation.564 The sentencing 
judge ultimately sentenced the defendant to 8 years with a total suspended term of 72 years, and 
the defendant appealed the sentence.565 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that given the specific circumstances and facts of the crime and conviction, the 
defendant’s sentence was excessive.566 The court applied the “clearly mistaken” test and found 
that although discretion is necessary for sentencing judges, the decision was not within a 
permissible range of reasonable sentences.567 The court reasoned that while courts had upheld 
similar sentences where the sentencing court determined that the defendant’s conduct or the 
defendant were particularly dangerous, and that the defendant lacked distinctly poor prospects 
for rehabilitation.568 Instead, Smith’s conduct was extremely typical for the type of 
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offense.569 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held a 72-year suspended 
sentence for possession of child pornography excessive because the sentence is not appropriate 
given the facts of the crime, even when taking other goals, such as deterrence of others, into 
consideration.570 
 
Snowden v. State 
In Snowden v. State,571 the court of appeals held that the search of a residence after an open-line 
911 call is lawful if the totality of the circumstances gave the officers reasonable grounds to 
believe an emergency was occurring.572 At around 3:00 in the morning, the police received a 911 
call in which the line stayed connected but no one responded on the other end.573 Police were 
dispatched to the location, which had a restaurant on the top floor and a residence on the 
bottom.574 When police arrived, there was a taxi driver outside who claimed to be waiting for a 
passenger who never arrived.575 After finding the back door ajar, police entered the restaurant 
and found a phone with an open line but no one in the restaurant.576 When police knocked at the 
door of the lower residence, Snowden opened it and claimed that there was no emergency and 
that he didn’t know who had placed the call.577 The officers entered Snowden’s apartment to see 
if anyone inside needed assistance and found drugs in plain view.578 At trial, Snowden was 
convicted on multiple drug counts.579 On appeal, Snowden argued that the open-line call was not 
sufficient to justify a search of his dwelling and, therefore, the court should have suppressed the 
drug evidence.580 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that, while an 
open-line 911 call alone is not sufficient, the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable 
suspicion for the officers to search Snowden’s dwelling.581 The court of appeals further reasoned 
that police are not obligated to set aside reasonable suspicion simply because a resident claims 
that there is no emergency.582 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that 
the search of a residence after an open-line 911 call is lawful if the totality of the circumstances 
gave the officers reasonable grounds to believe an emergency was occurring. 
 
State v. Alexander 
In State v. Alexander,583 the court of appeals ruled that introduction of evidence from a “control 
question” polygraph examination may, under certain conditions, be admissible.584 Alexander was 
charged by the state of Alaska with multiple instances of sexual abuse of a minor.585 Before the 
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trial began, Alexander’s attorney arranged for him to take a polygraph exam, in which the results 
suggested that Alexander did not commit the acts of abuse.586 Alexander’s case was joined with 
another man who had also taken a polygraph test, and the issue of whether such evidence should 
be admissible was brought before two superior court judges.587 The judges ruled that the 
polygraph evidence would be admissible, so long as Alexander submitted to an independent 
polygraph examination, and testified at trial.588 On appeal, the State argued that such polygraph 
evidence was inadmissible, while Alexander asked that the conditions imposed by the lower 
court be removed.589 The court of appeals, ruling only on the particular facts at hand, affirmed 
the lower court’s decision, finding that the trial court judges did not abuse their discretion.590 The 
court, in applying the Daubert test, questioned (1) whether the reasoning underlying proposed 
evidence is scientifically valid, and (2) whether the reasoning can be applied to the issues in a 
case.591 Noting that reasonable judges could differ as to whether the reasoning was scientifically 
valid, the court of appeals found that the judges did not abuse their discretion for the first prong 
of the test.592 The court also affirmed the lower court’s ruling under the second prong of Daubert, 
reasoning that the two conditions imposed by the lower court ensured that any weaknesses of 
polygraph testing would be countered effectively, since the conditions ensured a lack of bias and 
prevented potential hearsay problems.593 Affirming the lower court decision, the court of appeals 
ruled that introduction of polygraph evidence, under certain conditions, may be used as 
admissible evidence.594 
 
State v. Howard 
In State v. Howard,595 the court of appeals held that it could not issue jail-time credit for time 
spent at a treatment facility without first determining under whose authority it was 
ordered.596 After serving time for third-degree assault, Howard was released on probation, which 
was subsequently revoked four times.597 After the third revocation, the sentence imposed was 
long enough to trigger mandatory parole.598 After release, Howard served probation and parole 
concurrently and the same person served as both his probation and parole officer.599 This officer 
directed Howard to reside at a halfway house and drug rehabilitation center.600 After violating his 
probation again, Howard claimed he should have received enough jail-time credit from his stay 
at the treatment facilities for his probation to be complete.601 Rather than ruling on this issue, the 
judge determined that Howard should be discharged because his probation length was 
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miscalculated after it was revoked the second time.602 On appeal, the State argued that this 
finding was erroneous and that he would not be entitled to credit if he was ordered under the 
authority of the Parole Board.603 The appeals court agreed the miscalculation was erroneous; 
however, the record lacked sufficient facts to determine whether Howard was ordered to receive 
treatment as part of his parole or probation.604 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of 
appeals held that it could not issue jail-time credit for time spent at a treatment facility without 
first determining under whose authority it was ordered.605 
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Augustine v. State 
In Augustine v. State,606 the court of appeals held that out-of-court evidence is admissible under 
evidence rules only after a trial judge evaluates and determines that the State has met its burden 
of proof.607 Out-of-court interviews of Augustine’s granddaughters were admitted and heavily 
relied upon by the State throughout Augustine’s trial.608 Augustine appealed his sexual abuse 
convictions, arguing that the trial judge inadequately considered two criteria necessary to admit 
evidence under the Evidence Rules 801.609 Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) expressly authorizes the 
admission of out-of-court statements given by children under 16 years of age, provided certain 
criteria are met.610 On appeal, the court of appeals found that, upon challenge by the defense, two 
criteria, (F) and (H), required the trial judge to determine the reliability and trustworthiness of 
the evidence, and the neutrality with which the evidence was gathered.611 Specifically, the court 
of appeals determined that the trial judge did not adequately consider the substantive reasons 
presented by defense to doubt the reliability of the out-of-court interviews, as required to meet 
his statutory duty.612 Remanding the case for further determinations of reliability and 
trustworthiness of evidence, the court of appeals held that a trial judge has an affirmative duty to 
determine that the criteria required for evidence admissibility are proven by the party seeking 
admission. 
 
Bush v. Elkins 
In Bush v. Elkins, the supreme court held that a trial court could not award a prevailing party 
insurance fees without informing the responding party that they were permitted to respond to the 
motion.613 The complaint arose out of a single-car accident, in which an adult passenger was 
injured.614 The passenger’s father, Bush, attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but 
the superior court dismissed the claim, holding that the complaint did not state such a claim on 
his behalf.615 Bush later attempted to file an amended complaint, but the superior court denied it 
because he had already been dismissed from the case.616 The superior court granted final 
judgment to the insurer, who then moved for attorneys’ fees, which the court granted without 
soliciting a response from Bush.617 The supreme court held that because Bush was left with the 
belief that he was not permitted to file responsive pleadings, and the superior court was on notice 
of this misunderstanding, the superior court was required to inform Bush of his ability to respond 
to the motion for attorneys’ fees.618 The court emphasizes however, that this holding is limited to 
the unique facts presented.619 The supreme court vacated the fee award and remanded the case, 
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holding that a trial court could not award a prevailing party insurance fees without informing the 
responding party that they were permitted to respond to the motion.620 
 
City of Juneau v. State 
 In City of Juneau v. State,621 the supreme court held that the local Boundary Commission was 
not required to conduct a “head-to-head” analysis as between a dissolving city and a neighboring 
borough to determine whether the city had superior common interests to the contested area, in 
order to satisfy its constitutional obligations to make borough decisions from a statewide 
perspective prior to granting the city’s petition.622 In 2011, the city of Petersburg petitioned the 
Boundary Commission to dissolve the city and incorporate a new borough, which the 
Commission accepted.623 Juneau filed an annexation petition which overlapped with a significant 
portion of Petersburg’s dissolution petition, and requested concurrent consideration with the 
Petersburg petition.624 The Commission eventually denied Juneau’s petition for consolidation or 
postponement, instead giving Juneau the opportunity to object at the final hearing.625 The 
Commission approved the Petersburg petition, leaving little of the contested area for Juneau’s 
later annexation.626 Juneau appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Commission’s 
decision, and Juneau appealed again.627 The supreme court held that, although the Alaska 
Constitution requires the Commission to make boundary decisions using a statewide approach, 
that did not require the Commission to fully consider each city’s petition in a “head-to-head” 
analysis before making a decision.628 Rather, the Commission must simply determine whether 
the proposed borough embraced an area with common interests to the maximum degree possible, 
which presupposes a thorough consideration of alternative boundaries.629 Thus, the supreme 
court affirmed the decision approving Petersburg’s petition and denied Juneau’s petition for a 
concurrent analysis.630 
 
Downs v. State 
In Downs v. State,631 the court of appeals held that issues decided in a previous appeal become 
the law of the case and generally cannot be considered anew in the same case.632 Mark Alan 
Downs, who was charged for driving with a revoked license, argued that police lacked 
reasonable suspicion to pull him over and filed a motion to suppress evidence used against 
him.633 The trial court denied the motion and Downs appealed to the superior court, which 
affirmed the denial.634 After Downs was convicted by the trial court, he appealed the same issue 
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to the court of appeals.635 The court of appeals ruled that Downs could not raise the same issue 
again on appeal, reasoning that the superior court ruling on the issue was final, thus becoming 
the law of the case.636 The court of appeals reasoned that in the absence of a clear error that 
would cause an injustice, the law of the case doctrine prevented the appellate court from 
reconsidering an issue that was already decided on appeal in the same case.637 The court further 
reasoned that this doctrine was designed to promote policies of efficiency, fairness, and 
consistency.638 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that issues decided 
in a previous appeal become the law of the case and generally cannot be reconsidered in the 
same case.639 
 
In re Dakota K. 
In In re Dakota K., the supreme court held that the respondent in involuntary commitment cases 
has the burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence after the commitment period has 
passed to prove that the commitment was the respondent’s first commitment.640 After violating a 
restraining order, the respondent was admitted to a psychiatric institute where he was evaluated 
by a psychiatrist who subsequently recommended that the respondent remain until his behavior 
was under control.641 The superior court granted a 30-day commitment petition.642 After his 
commitment, Dakota appealed the order, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.643 The 
supreme court noted that such appeals are moot after the commitment period has passed unless 
the commitment was a first, giving rise to collateral consequences, such as social 
stigma.644 Because the respondent could not prove that the commitment was his first, the court 
concluded that the appeal was moot.645 The supreme court held that the burden rests on the 
respondent in involuntary commitment cases when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
after the commitment period has passed to prove that the commitment was his first.646 
 
In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of REID K. 
In In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of REID K.,647 the supreme court held 
that when reviewing whether evidence should be disallowed, the public interest exception to the 
mootness doctrine does not apply if the appellant cannot point to any statutory language 
indicating that the legislature sought to disallow this type of evidence.648 In August 2013 the 
superior court entered a 30-day involuntary civil commitment order for Reid.649 After holding a 
contested evidentiary hearing, the court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that 
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he was mentally ill and therefore a danger to himself and others.650 Reid appealed this 30-day 
commitment.651 However before he appealed, Reid’s doctors requested a 90-day 
commitment.652 At the trial for the 90-day commitment, Reid stipulated that he was mentally 
ill.653 Therefore, Reid’s appeal for the 30-day commitment order did not have collateral 
consequences in light of his stipulation to being mentally ill.654 On appeal, Reid argued that his 
case was not moot because the evidence used against him was insufficient, claiming that some of 
the clinical risk assessments that doctor’s presented at trial were unreliable.655 The supreme court 
affirmed the lower courts ruling that he was mentally ill, stating that Reid’s arguments turn on 
factual questions about the reliability of clinical tests and marijuana studies.656 The court noted 
that Reid did not reference any questions of statutory interpretation, which is required in order to 
meet the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.657 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court held that when reviewing whether evidence should be disallowed, 
the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply if the appellant cannot point 
to any statutory language that the legislature sought to disallow this type of evidence.658 
 
Jennifer L. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Jennifer L. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services,659 the supreme court 
held that if public interest in the legal issue is significant enough, the court may consider an 
otherwise moot case.660 The State Office of Children’s Services took three minor children into 
emergency custody, and then sought a court order granting them temporary custody.661 No 
probable cause was found and the standing master recommended that the children be returned to 
their mother’s custody.662 The State objected to the master’s recommendation, and three weeks 
later the superior court reviewed the case and rejected it.663 The mother then filed an appeal, 
asking the supreme court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes 
without judicial review.664 However, the superior court then dismissed the underlying case, 
making the appeal moot.665 The supreme court, agreeing to consider the case, applied the public 
interest exception to the mootness doctrine.666 The court found that the question of whether a 
child should be promptly returned home is a question important to the public interest that may 
arise again.667 The court reasoned that this issue is unlikely to ever be resolved without a 
mootness exception, as in many similar cases the superior court will proceed with adjudication, 
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mooting the probable cause determination and allowing the question to evade 
review.668 Affirming the lower courts decision, the supreme court held that if public interest in 
the legal issue is significant enough, the court may consider an otherwise moot case.669 
 
Kelley v. State 
In Kelley v. State,670 the court of appeals held that the police cannot avail themselves of the 
public access exception to warrant requirement when they access a person’s property at an 
unreasonable time of night.671 After receiving an anonymous tip that the defendant was growing 
marijuana on her property, two police officers dove up the defendant’s driveway shortly after 
midnight, claimed to smell marijuana, and obtained a warrant to search the premises.672 After 
searching the defendant’s home, police found a number of marijuana plants and other evidence 
of a commercial grow operation.673 At trial, defendant moved to suppress this evidence, claiming 
that the police had no right to drive up her driveway to sniff for marijuana at that time of night 
and, therefore, the search and seizure was unlawful.674 The trial court denied the 
motion.675 While defendant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Florida v. Jardines,676 which discussed the limits of this type of police access to 
residential premises.677 Applying the limitations expressed by the Court in Jardines, the court of 
appeals held that the officers’ entrance onto the premises was conducted at an unreasonable time 
and, therefore, unlawful.678 The court of appeals reasoned that the public access exception is 
limited not only to the normal paths of ingress and egress, but also by the manner of the 
visit.679 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals found that the public access 
exception does not extend to entering the curtilage of a person’s property well after hours that a 
person could expect any private citizen to approach their property.680 
 
Lampley v. State 
In Lampley v. State,681 the court of appeals held that dismissal of a petition following a decision 
of no arguable merit requires that a court issue an initial decision with reasons, allow comments 
from the parties, re-evaluate its decision based on any submitted comments, and then issue a 
final order.682 Lampley filed a petition for post-conviction relief and was denied by the superior 
court following consideration of his attorney’s submitted certificate of “no arguable merit” and a 
conclusion that the petition had no arguable merit.683 On appeal, Lampley argued, and the State 
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conceded, that the procedure in Lampley’s case did not meet criminal law requirements.684 The 
court of appeals vacated the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the lower court, upon 
determining that the petition had no merit, should have provided Lampley and the State with the 
opportunity to respond to the court’s reasoning for its decision.685 Reasoning that because the 
lower court’s reasons could have differed from those provided by the attorney’s certificate, the 
parties were entitled to an opportunity to comment prior to a final decision by the 
court.686 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the lower court’s 
initial decision to dismiss a petition due to a lack of arguable merit requires an opportunity for 
both sides to respond with comments, prior to the court issuing its final decision.687 
 
Mantor v. State 
In Mantor v. State,688 the supreme court held that a defendant’s probation period is tolled when a 
probationer is imprisoned for another crime, even if the incarceration was for parole 
violations.689 In 1990, Mantor was convicted of first-degree sexual assault and first-degree 
assault, sentenced to imprisonment and probation to expire five years after his release from 
incarceration.690 After his release from incarceration in 2006, he returned to incarceration twice 
for parole violations.691 When Mantor committed new crimes in 2013, the State filed a petition to 
revoke his probation.692 On appeal, Mantor argued that his probation continued even when he 
was returned to prison for parole violations, in which case his probation period ended over a year 
before his new crimes.693 The supreme court held that there is well-established precedent that a 
defendant’s probation period is tolled between the filing of a petition to revoke probation and the 
petition’s adjudication, regardless of whether the interruption occurs because the defendant 
absconds from supervision or because the defendant is incarcerated for misconduct.694 Affirming 
the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a defendant’s probation period is tolled 
when a probationer is imprisoned for parole violations.695 
 
Richardson v. Municipality of Anchorage 
In Richardson v. Municipality of Anchorage,696 the supreme court held that a cause of action 
accrues when a party knows or should know that he has a claim.697 Richardson filed a complaint 
alleging obstruction of justice, trespass, unlawful arrest and false imprisonment from events that 
transpired when he was arrested for a shoplifting incident at Best Buy.698 The municipality and 
Best Buy moved to dismiss his complaint as untimely under the two-year statute of limitations, 
since the alleged wrongs occurred on July 7, 2010, but Richardson only filed his suit – at the 
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earliest – on July 17, 2012.699 The superior court granted this motion to dismiss.700 On appeal, 
Richardson argues that his mental disorder should toll on the statute, and he only discovered this 
when seen by a doctor outside July 20th, 2010.701 The supreme court affirmed the lower courts 
decision, reasoning that Richardson’s cause of action accrued no later than July 14, 2010, when 
he was arrested.702 Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not rule until the 
claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, all the essential elements for his cause 
of action.703 However, Richardson does not explain how his alleged mental disorder is an 
essential part of his claim, nor does he point to any other elements of the claim that remained 
undiscovered after his July 14th arrest.704 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that a cause of action accrues when a party knows or should know that he has a claim.705  
 
Rogers v. State 
In Rogers v. State,706 the court of appeals held that the state has the burden to prove that a police 
officer conducting a search before impounding a vehicle was conducting a valid vehicle 
inventory search and not looking for evidence instead.707 In April 2007, two police officers 
detained Kyle Rogers for driving without a valid license or insurance and decided to impound his 
car.708 One officer searched Rogers’ car allegedly to take inventory of its contents and found 
cocaine inside.709 The officer obtained a search warrant four days later, but found no additional 
drug evidence.710 The lower court upheld the validity of the search and Rogers was convicted of 
a drug offense.711 On appeal, Rogers challenged his conviction by arguing that it was illegal for 
the officer to search his car without a warrant.712 The court of appeals ruled that the state failed to 
meet its burden to establish that the warrantless search of Rogers’ car was authorized as a routine 
inventory search preceding impoundment.713 The court of appeals found that the facts suggested 
the officer was looking for evidence of criminal activity rather than simply taking inventory of 
the car’s contents.714 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals held that the state 
has the burden to prove that a police officer conducting a search before impounding a vehicle 
was conducting a valid vehicle inventory search and not looking for evidence instead.715 
 
Saepharn v. State 
In Saepharn v. State, the court of appeals held that an officer’s pat-down search did not exceed 
lawful limits when there was probable cause to believe the target was in possession of a 
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controlled substance.716 The defendant was charged with fourth-degree controlled substance 
misconduct after police searched him for weapons and instead felt and removed a bag of 
methamphetamine from his pocket.717 The defendant challenged the officer’s authority to remove 
the bag since it did not reasonably appear to be a weapon and moved to suppress this 
evidence.718 Finding the defendant’s short were thin enough to feel its contents, the superior 
court denied the motion.719 Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals noted that, while a 
pat-down search is generally limited to what is necessary to discover weapons, contraband may 
be seized if it is discovered.720 The court reasoned that the surrounding circumstances gave the 
officer reason to suspect drug possession and the plain feel provided probable cause for further 
investigation into the baggie’s contents.721 The court of appeals held that an officer’s pat-down 
search did not exceed lawful limits when there was probable cause to believe the target was in 
possession of a controlled substance.722 
 
State v. Pete 
In State v. Pete,723 the supreme court held that the State’s pursuance of a felony indictment 
against a defendant already charged with a misdemeanor for the same crime did not give rise to a 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness, where such indictment was brought after the 
defendant’s assertion of his right to trial to the misdemeanor charge.724 On November 30th, the 
State initially charged William Quiciq Pete with misdemeanor assault of his girlfriend.725 At an 
arraignment three months later, the prosecutor informed Pete that the State would seek to indict 
him for felony third-degree assault, but the State did not immediately take the new charges to the 
grand jury.726 At a trial conference call for the misdemeanor charges, Pete’s public defender 
informed the State that he intended the case to proceed to trial.727 Two days later, the State filed 
felony charges against the defendant.728 Pete moved to dismiss the indictment for vindictive 
prosecution, arguing that the State only brought the felony charges as retaliation for asserting his 
right to trial.729 The superior court ruled that the facts supported a presumption of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness, because the State had failed to file the felony charges until after Pete indicated his 
intention to go to trial on the misdemeanor charge.730 Moreover, the superior court denied the 
State the opportunity to present evidence that rebutted the presumption of prosecutorial 
vindictiveness.731 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the lower court’s ruling of a 
presumption of vindictiveness and remanded the case to allow Pete to bear the burden of proving 
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prosecutorial vindictiveness, reasoning that no presumption attaches to decisions increasing the 
severity of criminal charges already made by the State before the initial indictment.732 
 
State v. Stidston 
In State v. Stidston,733 the Court of Appeals held Alaska’s rape shield law contains a general 
good cause exception to the statutory pretrial deadline for making a request to offer evidence of 
the complaining witness’s sexual history.734 Stidston was charged with sexually assaulting the 
victim, but failed to present evidence of the victim’s sexual history by the statutory 
deadline.735 Stidston argued the statute is unconstitutional because the only statutory exception of 
good cause for extending the deadline would be if the defendant discovered the relevant 
information after the statutory deadline had passed, which would infringe on his right against 
self-incrimination.736 The Court of Appeals disagreed, because the statute’s reference to “good 
cause” created a general exception even through trial, of which discovering relevant information 
after the deadline passes is merely one example.737 The legislative history of the act also made 
clear that Senators voiced concerns that a rigid pretrial deadline could unconstitutionally infringe 
on defendants’ rights, and that the amendment was intended to allow extension if the deadline 
proved unreasonable.738 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the Court of Appeals holds that 
Alaska’s rape shield law contains a general good cause exception to the statutory pretrial 
deadline for making a request to offer evidence of the complaining witness’s sexual history, and 
is constitutional.739 
 
Waterman v. State 
In Waterman v. State,740 the supreme court held that the legislature is constitutionally empowered 
to determine the standard of care applicable to criminally negligent homicide and need not vary 
the standard according to a defendant’s age.741 Waterman was charged of criminally negligent 
homicide at age 16 for failing to take any reasonable steps to warn or alert her mother or the 
police about a plot to kill her mother.742 At trial, Waterman sought a modified jury instruction 
altering the standard of care applicable to her conduct using expert evidence that the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain continues to develop until age 25.743 The trial judge denied this instruction, 
finding that the legislature had deliberately chosen a single standard of care, and was 
constitutionally empowered to make that choice.744 On appeal, Waterman argued again that a 
different standard of care applied to her conduct based on her youth, relying on a previous 
decision where the court tailored the extreme indifference standard in a juvenile case to consider 
a minor’s age, and the corresponding expert evidence presented at trial.745 The supreme court 
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affirmed the trial court’s denial of a different standard of care, reasoning that Waterman was 
prosecuted as a adult, not a juvenile, and therefore the precedent she cited did not apply.746 The 
supreme court cited prior decisions supporting the legislature’s ability to define crimes and 
concluded that the legislature intended to apply adult criminal prosecution laws to juveniles 
prosecuted for felonies.747 Finally, the court reasoned that the scientific evidence, which did not 
apply to all individuals under age 25,748 did not require the legislature to alter its objective 
definition of negligence.749 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the 
legislature’s use of a single standard of care applicable to criminal negligence is constitutional.750 
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ELECTION LAW 
 
Lieutenant Governor of State v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance, Inc. 
 In Lieutenant Governor of State v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance, Inc.,751 the supreme 
court held that a ballot initiative is prohibited where it appropriates a public asset, by producing a 
give-away program or restricting the ability of the legislature to allocate such assets.752 Alaska 
Fisheries Conservation Alliance, Inc., a nonprofit, proposed a ballot initiative that would bar 
commercial set nets in non-subsistence areas.753 The Department of Laws found that the 
proposed initiative was improper for ballot certification because, although it discussed only one 
subject that was properly stated in the title and included a properly formed enacting clause, the 
initiative constituted an appropriation, from minority users, commercial set netters, to majority 
users, personal use fishers.754 The Lieutenant Governor accordingly declined to certify.755 The 
superior court awarded summary judgment to Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance, ordering 
the Lieutenant Governor to certify the initiative, which was not a prohibited appropriation.756 On 
appeal, the supreme court used a two part test to determine whether the ballot initiative created 
or repealed an appropriation, which the Alaska Constitution prohibits in article XI, section 
7.757 The supreme court found, to be an appropriation, the initiative (1) must pertain to a public 
asset and (2) must appropriate that asset, which occurs where the core objectives are impacted, 
namely where an initiative amounts to a give-away program or restricts the legislature’s power to 
allocate state assets as needed.758 Both core objectives were violated here, causing an 
appropriation of an asset: (1) a give-away program existed where the initiative caused an asset to 
be fully reallocated from a discrete user group and also likely would result in gains for other user 
groups, and (2) the legislature’s allocation authority was restricted by a constraint on a discrete 
user group.759 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that appropriating a public asset 
either through a give-away program or a restriction on legislative ability to allocate that asset 
constitutes an improper use of a ballot initiative.760 
 
RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Alaska Public Offices Commission 
In RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Alaska Public Offices Commission,761 the supreme court held that a 
Commission decision to fine a corporation which engaged in illegal corporate contributions can 
be appropriate when the fine serves the legislature’s intentions.762 The Alaska Public Offices 
Commission investigated complaints about RBG Bush Planes, LLC, a corporation, and then filed 
a complaint that the corporation had violated Alaska state election law.763 Specifically, the 
Commission alleged that the corporation made illegal contributions to candidates when, 
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following several chartered flights, two candidates were charged only for a portion of the fuel 
costs associated with their flights.764 After testimony regarding market airfare rates at a 
Commission hearing, the Commission determined that it was unreasonable to charge fuel-only 
rates, and gave the corporation a large fine to convey the need for deterrence.765 On appeal, the 
superior court affirmed the determinations of the Commission, and denied the corporation’s 
motion to supplement.766 Then the supreme court, after supporting the Commission’s 
determination that the corporation made an illegal corporate contribution, stated that the fine 
imposed for that violation was not unconstitutionally excessive.767 Specifically, the fine met the 
intention of the underlying law, was reasonably related to the corporation’s offense, and the 20:1 
ratio did not constitute an innate violation.768 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court 
held that fines are not unconstitutionally excessive when supported by the legislature’s purposes 
in enactment.769 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth 
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth,770 the supreme court held that equitable estoppel 
prevents an employer from avoiding an employee settlement agreement by later denying the 
authority of its agents to settle the case.771 In 1996, Lee Stenseth entered into a compromise and 
release agreement with his employer, the Municipality of Anchorage (“Municipality”), after 
being injured at work.772 Stenseth later served time in prison for selling narcotics he acquired 
through his work-related injury.773 Shortly after Stenseth was released from prison, the 
Municipality filed a petition seeking reimbursement for the benefits given to Stenseth and the 
parties’ attorneys reached a $30,000 settlement.774 The Municipality claimed that the settlement 
was void because its attorneys did not have the authority to make large settlements without 
approval, but the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) ruled that the settlement was 
enforceable.775 The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (“Commission”) 
agreed with the Board’s findings and held that equitable estoppel applied.776 The Municipality 
appealed, arguing that settlement procedure was violated and its agents acted without 
authority.777 The supreme court affirmed the Commission’s decision, reasoning that equitable 
estoppel prevents the Municipality from declaring a settlement void because its attorneys 
misunderstood their authority.778 The supreme court found that Stenseth reasonably relied on the 
settlement and had been prejudiced by the Municipality’s attempt to avoid the settlement.779 The 
supreme court also noted that the public policy of settling disputes weighs in favor of 
estoppel.780 Affirming the Commission’s decision, the supreme court held that equitable estoppel 
prevents an employer from avoiding an employee settlement agreement by later denying the 
authority of its agents to settle the case.781 
 
Rodriguez v. State, Commission for Human Rights 
In Rodriguez v. State, Commission for Human Rights,782 the supreme court held that a 
complainant alleging race-based employment discrimination fails to rebut an employer’s 
legitimate non-discriminatory hiring decisions by responding only that such decisions were in 
retaliation for reporting harassment due to complaint’s sexual orientation.783 Rodriguez, a gay 
Hispanic man, was furloughed by his employer, Delta Airlines, following a record of poor work 
attendance, a record which he claimed was caused by the lasting stress of another employee 
harassing him due to his sexual orientation.784 Rodriguez had earlier reported the harassment to 
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Delta, the latter proceeding to terminate the harasser.785 Rodriguez’s position was later filled by a 
less-senior Caucasian employee who in the past had maintained perfect attendance.786 Rodriguez 
subsequently filed a complaint with the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, alleging 
employment discrimination based on his race.787 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal of Rodriguez’s complaint, reasoning that the state statute barring certain 
types of employment discrimination does not include discrimination based on a complainant’s 
sexual orientation; and that in evaluating discrimination claims the court uses a three-step 
burden-shifting framework.788 At step one, Rodriguez had established a prima facie case of race-
based discrimination by showing that Delta hired of a less-senior Caucasian employee over 
Rodriguez, a Hispanic man; but when Delta countered at step two by articulating non-
discriminatory reasons for its hiring decision (relative work attendance), Rodriguez rebutted at 
step three only by asserting that he was in fact not rehired in retaliation for reporting the earlier 
sexual orientation harassment.789 In resorting solely to rebuttals concerning sexual orientation 
and retaliation, the court reasoned, Rodriguez neglected to establish a reasonable possibility 
of race-based discrimination.790 Affirming the lower court’s opinion, the supreme court held that 
a complainant alleging race-based employment discrimination fails to rebut an employer’s 
legitimate non-discriminatory hiring decisions by a showing that such decisions were in 
retaliation for reporting harassment due to complaint’s sexual orientation.791 
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Cook Inlet Fisherman’s Fund v. State 
In Cook Inlet Fisherman’s Fund v. State,792 the supreme court held decisions made by the 
Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (“Department”) in 2013 regarding 
the Upper Cook Inlet fishery, limiting time for and later closing the fishery to set net fishing, did 
not amount to fishery mismanagement.793 In 2013, the Upper Cook commercial fishing season 
saw both a strong sockeye salmon run and the weakest Kenai River king salmon run on 
record.794 Sockeye salmon are targeted by both set and drift netters in the Upper Cook, but set 
netters accidentally caught more king salmon than drift netters.795 In June 2013, in an effort to 
increase the king salmon run while controlling the sockeye run, the Commissioner began limiting 
the amount of time set netters were permitted to fish the Upper Cook by adding fewer than the 
customary number of extra fishing periods.796 On July 28, 2013, the Commissioner closed the set 
net fishery for the season797 Cook Inlet Fisherman’s Fund (CIFF) sued the Department on July 
17, 2013, and sought a preliminary injunction compelling the opening of additional set net 
fishing time periods.798 CIFF argued that, under a sockeye salmon management plan adopted by 
the Department, the Commissioner was required to allow 51 hours of extra fishing periods when 
the Kenai River sockeye run was strong.799 The superior court denied CIFF’s injunction request, 
refusing to second-guess the Commissioner’s discretionary use of emergency authority, and 
reasoning that the Commissioner could not be required to provide discretionary fishing 
periods.800 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, ruling that the 
Commissioner’s actions fell within the permitted range of discretion.801 The supreme court held 
decisions made by the Commissioner in 2013 regarding the Upper Cook Inlet fishery, limiting 
time for and later closing the fishery to set net fishing, did not amount to fishery 
mismanagement.802 
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ETHICS 
 
In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Deborah Ivy 
In In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Deborah Ivy,803 the supreme court held that the Alaska 
Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 and 3.4 were intended to govern attorneys when they are 
acting as advocates and not in their personal capacities.804 Ivy, an attorney by profession, brought 
multiple sexual assault claims against Kyzer, and falsified statements she made when testifying 
in court.805 The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from falsifying 
information or evidence in to a tribunal.806 On appeal from the Hearing Committee and Board of 
Governors’ decision to disbar Ivy, Ivy argued that the rules are limited to a lawyer’s conduct 
when representing a client.807 The supreme court agreed, reasoning that the Alaska Rules were 
modeled after the Model Rules set forth by the ABA, to which the commentary, as a guide to 
interpretation of the Model Rules, has been interpreted to mean that the rule is limited to a 
lawyer’s conduct in a representational capacity before a court, and not to personal 
conduct.808 Reversing the Hearing Committee and Board of Governors’ decision, the supreme 
held that the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 and 3.4 were intended to govern attorneys 
when they are acting as advocates and not in their personal capacities.809 
 
McGee v. Alaska Bar Ass’n 
In McGee v. Alaska Bar Ass’n,810 the supreme court held that the Bar Counsel did not err in 
determining that a formal investigation of an ethics grievance was unwarranted, where the 
Counsel considered relevant evidence from prior reports, and reasonably concluded that a formal 
investigation would be unlikely to bring forth new material facts relevant to the 
grievance.811 McGee filed a grievance with the Alaska Bar Association, alleging that an attorney 
in the Office of Public Advocacy had violated a variety of rules dealing with an attorney’s duties 
to his client.812 Specifically, McGee alleged that the attorney had wrongfully continued using a 
private criminal defense investigator where the contracting process was corrupt.813 The 
Department of Law subsequently ruled that the contracting process had been unduly restrictive, 
but declined to open a formal investigation on the grounds that there were no intentional 
procurement violations.814 On appeal, McGee argued that the Bar Counsel had used a clear and 
convincing standard of presenting evidence, which was the incorrect standard for the grievance 
process.815 The supreme court affirmed the Bar Counsel’s decision, holding that McGee had 
misinterpreted the Counsel’s ruling.816 The supreme court found that the Counsel had considered 
the evidence from prior reports regarding the matter in the Department of Administration, as well 
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as the Department of Law, and that the Counsel could have reasonably determined that a formal 
investigation would have not only wasted time and resources, but would also have likely failed to 
bring forth any new relevant new material facts to the case.817 Because the Counsel had the 
discretion to close grievances when they believed them to be unwarranted, and because its 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious, the supreme court saw no breakdown in the grievance 
process.818 Affirming the Bar Counsel’s decision, the supreme court held that the Bar Counsel 
did not err in determining that a formal investigation of an ethics grievance was unwarranted, 
where it considered relevant evidence from prior reports, and reasonably concludes that a formal 
investigation would be unlikely to bring forth new material facts relevant to the grievance.819 
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EVIDENCE LAW 
 
Sanders v. State 
In Sanders v. State,820 the supreme court held that the lower court improperly excluded evidence 
on a phone recording given by an unavailable declarant where the recording met the basic 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.821 On trial for murder, Sanders sought to admit a 
recording of a phone call to the police placed by a woman who died prior to trial and was thus 
not available for testimony.822 On the recording, the woman told the officer of her personal 
knowledge that the two victims shot by Sanders had been conspiring to assault and rob 
him.823 The trial court excluded the recording on the grounds that there was no guarantee of 
trustworthiness.824 Sanders was then convicted of murder on all counts.825 The court of appeals 
affirmed the exclusion of the recording and found it did not unfairly limit Sanders’ 
defense.826 On appeal, Sanders contended the exclusion was reversible error and that the 
recording was admissible under Alaska Rules of Evidence 803(3) and 804(b)(5).827 The supreme 
court reasoned that the lower courts misinterpreted the woman’s statements on the 
recording.828 In doing so, the lower courts had also subjected the recording to an overly 
demanding test for trustworthiness given the later death of the declarant.829 The court then found 
that the woman had met at least five factors arguing in favor of her trustworthiness.830 She 
exhibited no reason to speak insincerely given her relationship to the parties and spontaneously 
sought out the detective in his capacity as the principal investigator.831 She also would have 
known false statements would lead to liability and knew she was being recorded.832 Finally, she 
demonstrated clear first-hand knowledge of the circumstances that could be corroborated.833 The 
supreme court, reviewing de novo, found the recording met the basic circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness.834 
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FAMILY LAW 
 
Andrea C. v. Marcus K. 
In Andrea C. v. Marcus K.,835 the supreme court discussed a superior court’s broad discretion in 
not applying collateral estoppel and in weighing best interest factors in custody disputes, in the 
context of specific facts.836 Andrea filed a child custody modification request based on her 
impending relocation.837 The superior court awarded Marcus primary physical and sole legal 
custody of two minor children, finding him to be the more emotionally stable and consistent 
parent for the children.838 Andrea appealed on the grounds that the lower court erred in giving no 
weight to her domestic violence allegations against Marcus, and did not give the proper weight to 
each best interest factor.839 The supreme court held that even though Marcus may possibly have 
had a past history of domestic violence, there were no current concerns, and the original 
protective order against his him was merely for violating a no-contact order, not for proven 
domestic violence, and it was within the superior court’s discretion to not to apply non-mutual 
offensive collateral estoppel on the domestic violence issue.840 Furthermore, while the superior 
court cannot assign disproportionate weight to particular best interest factors while ignoring 
others, it has considerable discretion in determining the importance of each statutory factor in a 
given case.841 In this case, stability for the children seemed particularly important due to expert 
testimony.842 Thus, the supreme court affirmed and held that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion to not give weight to Andrea’s domestic violence allegations and to weigh the 
children’s stability as heavily as it did.843 
 
Caroline J. v. Theodore J. 
In Caroline J. v. Theodore J.,844 the supreme court held that a lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding a mother and father joint custody of three children when the court 
thoroughly considered the father’s history of domestic violence, as well as the mother’s attempts 
at parental alienation.845 In 2012, after being married for eight years and having three children, 
the wife alleged that the husband had hit her over the head with a pot, and asked for a protective 
order.846 In addition to granting the protective order, the superior court awarded interim custody 
to the mother.847 Upon reaching the custody trial, the superior court considered a variety of 
testimonies which stated that the father had some history of domestic abuse, but also that the 
mother had been purposely keeping the children away from reunification counseling.848 In the 
end, the superior court ordered that upon the father’s completion of a domestic violence 
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intervention program, joint legal custody would take place.849 On appeal, the mother argued that 
the superior court abused its discretion when considering the best interests of the children.850 The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the father had overcome a 
rebuttable presumption against joint physical custody, and that the mother’s attempts at parental 
alienation were compelling.851 The supreme court reasoned that the father had overcome a 
rebuttable presumption against joint custody because of his participation in an intervention 
program, and because there was evidence that the best interests of the children required the 
father’s participation as a custodial parent.852 Additionally, the fact that the mother had willfully 
attempted to damage the relationship between the father and the children weighed heavily in a 
finding for joint custody.853 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
the lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the mother and father joint custody of 
three children because the court thoroughly considered the father’s history of domestic violence, 
as well as the mother’s attempts at parental alienation.854 
 
Diana P. v. State 
In Diana P. v. State,855 the supreme court held that, under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 
when the basis for termination of parental rights is culturally neutral, the substantial-harm 
requirement can be met by a combination of lay testimony and other evidence that the parent’s 
conduct is harmful to the child, as well as expert testimony that the conduct is likely to 
continue.856 Diana P’s four young children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 
2013, and the trial court terminated Diana’s parental rights in the summer of 2014.857 Evidence 
introduced at trial showed Diana had struggled with mental illness and substance abuse, 
particularly alcohol use, since she was a teenager.858 Lay witnesses testified that Diana was not a 
good parent when she was drinking, and that when one of Diana’s children was four years old, 
the child became the caregiver for her younger siblings.859 Two experts in the diagnosis and 
treatment of substance abuse testified on behalf of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) at 
trial.860 In the opinion of both experts, Diana was in danger of relapsing unless she entered an 
intensive substance-abuse program and received therapy.861 The trial court terminated Diana’s 
parental rights under ICWA, holding that ICWA’s requirements are met even when expert 
witnesses are only qualified to testify regarding one prong of the ICWA substantial-harm 
requirement, with the second prong being proved through lay testimony and other 
evidence.862 On appeal, Diana argued the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that placing the children in Diana’s custody would likely cause them serious 
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harm.863 The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that, while ICWA 
requires that evidence supporting termination of parental rights include expert testimony, it does 
not require that expert testimony provide the sole basis for the determination.864 Affirming the 
trial court’s decision, the supreme court held that, under ICWA, when the basis for termination 
of parental rights is culturally neutral, the substantial-harm requirement can be met by a 
combination of lay testimony and other evidence that the parent’s conduct is harmful to the child, 
as well as expert testimony that the conduct is likely to continue.865 
 
Elk v. McBride 
In Elk v. McBride, the supreme court held that, in regards to child custody decisions, a court 
cannot hold prior litigation conduct against a party, unless it can substantiate that the party was 
not acting in good faith.866 Red Elk, a resident of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana, 
filed two separate petitions for emergency custody in the Fort Peck Tribal Court against Laura 
McBride, an Alaska resident with whom Red Elk has a daughter.867 The two petitions made 
various allegations of abuse and neglect, which were dismissed on the basis of jurisdiction and 
venue.868 When McBride filed a custody complaint in Alaska, the superior court considered Elk’s 
“false or exaggerated claims of abuse” in awarding primary custody to McBride and arranging a 
tiered visitation system.869 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the visitation 
schedule,870 finding that neither Tribal Court nor the Alaska superior court had assessed the 
merits of the allegations.871 While noting that unsupported allegations may suggest an 
unwillingness to foster a child’s relationship with a co-parent,872 the supreme court reasoned that 
the court could not make such assumptions about the parent’s fitness without 
substantiation.873 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that, in regards to child 
custody decisions, a court cannot hold prior litigation conduct against a party, unless it can 
substantiate that the party was not acting in good faith.874 
 
Engstrom v. Engstrom 
In Engstrom v. Engstrom,875 the supreme court held that a father’s income-producing businesses 
and the cost of childcare does not justify an unequal distribution of property in a divorce 
settlement.876 Andrew and Becky Engstrom were married in 1998.877 During the marriage 
Andrew worked for the two businesses he owns and Becky was a schoolteacher.878 The 
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Engstroms had a child together in 2003, before separating in 2010.879 In the divorce proceedings, 
the superior court divided the marital property pursuant to AS 25.24.160(a)(4), whereby 58.4 
percent of the marital property was allocated to Becky and 41.6 percent was allocated to 
Andy.880 The court justified this division on two grounds: Andy was receiving income producing 
properties through the businesses he owned and Becky would likely be taking care and custody 
of their child for the foreseeable future.881 On appeal, the supreme court found that such a 
distribution of marital property constituted an abuse of discretion, because the superior court 
reduced one party’s share of the marital estate on the grounds that he was allocated income-
producing property, when in fact these properties only allowed that party to reap an income on 
par with the other party’s salary.882 Moreover, the superior court further reasoned that 
consideration of one spouse’s role as the primary childcare provider constituted an abuse of 
direction, because the superior court did not make a finding about whether the mandated child 
support was inadequate to meet the child’s needs.883 Reversing the division of marital property 
and remanding the case for further proceedings, the supreme court found that a father’s income-
producing businesses and the cost of childcare to the other party in the proceeding does not 
justify an unequal distribution of property in a divorce settlement.884 
 
Faye H. v. James B. 
In Faye H. v. James B.,885 the supreme court held that the superior court failed to make sufficient 
findings regarding whether a father’s domestic violence triggers the rebuttable presumption that 
a parent with a history of domestic violence should not be awarded sole or joint physical custody 
under Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g).886 Faye H. and James B. began a relationship in late 2009, 
and had one child together.887 They separated shortly thereafter.888 The trial court ordered an 
equal physical custody arrangement and granted Faye’s motion for a long-term protective 
order.889 James then filed a complaint seeking sole legal and primary physical custody of the 
child.890 The superior court determined that an equal physical custody arrangement was in the 
child’s best interests and awarded legal custody to Faye.891 The court stated that the domestic 
violence perpetrated by James was not to a degree and frequency to trigger 25.24.150(g).892 Faye 
appeals this decision arguing that the superior court should have applied the presumption of 
25.24.150(g) in light of James’ repeated physical and verbal attacks against her.893 The supreme 
court found that the superior court erroneously focused on whether the abuse was continuous, 
which is not relevant under the statutory definition.894 This improper focus does not allow the 
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supreme court to evaluate the court’s ultimate conclusion that James lacked a history of 
perpetrating domestic violence.895 Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to the 
superior court, holding that it failed to make sufficient findings regarding whether a father’s 
domestic violence triggers the statutory rebuttable presumption.896 
 
Guerrero v. Guerrero 
In Guerrero v. Guerrero, the supreme court held that military benefits consisting entirely of 
disability retirement pay and disability benefits are not a divisible marital asset but are a factor in 
determining equitable division of marital property.897 A wife and husband dissolved their 
marriage and agreed to divide the marital home and husband’s military retirement benefits.898 As 
a result of injuries sustained during combat, the husband retired prematurely with benefits 
consisting entirely of retirement disability and disability pay.899 When the wife moved for the 
husband to directly pay her, the superior court determined that federal law proscribed the 
division of disability retirement and disability pay.900 Affirming the superior court, the supreme 
court found that the husband’s military pay could not be divided.901 However, the court 
concluded that this change destroyed a fundamental, underlying assumption of the parties’ 
dissolution agreement and ordered a re-opening and modification of the dissolution agreement to 
reflect the parties’ current financial situations.902 The supreme court held that military benefits 
consisting entirely of disability retirement pay and disability benefits are a factor in determining 
equitable division of marital property, despite not being a divisible marital asset.903 
 
Hope P. v. Flynn G. 
In Hope P. v. Flynn G.,904 the supreme court held that context can establish that a parent who 
pursues training for a career change is not unreasonably underemployed for purposes of 
calculating child support.905 Flynn G., a divorced father of two children, left his job as a 
telecommunications technician in 2012 and began an approximately five-year training program 
to become an electrician.906 Flynn’s former wife Hope argued that the lower court should impute 
income to Flynn for child support purposes because he voluntarily became unreasonably 
underemployed when he decided to switch careers.907 The lower court ruled that Flynn’s planned 
career shift was not unreasonable based on the circumstances.908 On appeal, Hope argued that 
income should be imputed to Flynn for child support purposes.909 The supreme court affirmed 
the lower court, reasoning that evidence showed Flynn’s plan to change careers was not 
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motivated by any bad faith desire to avoid paying child support.910 The court said that the lower 
court weighed appropriate factors, such as whether Flynn’s reduced income would financially 
burden his children or former spouse.911 The court said that evidence showed Flynn’s earnings 
could increase once he completed the training program.912 Affirming the lower court’s decision, 
the supreme court held that context can establish that a parent who pursues training for a career 
change is not unreasonably underemployed for purposes of calculating child support.913 
 
Horne v. Touhakis 
In Horne v. Touhakis,914 the supreme court held that the lower court’s lack of factual findings in 
determining imputed income were insufficient for appellate review of the decision.915 Horne and 
Touhakis were involved in an extended romantic relationship, during which Touhakis adopted a 
child.916 After the relationship terminated, Horne received visitation rights and was required to 
pay child support.917 After sustaining financial losses from failed entrepreneurial adventures, 
Horne requested to have his child support reduced.918 Horne agreed to have income imputed to 
him, and estimated he was capable of earning about $40,000 per year.919 Without detailing why, 
the lower court rejected this estimate as too low and, instead, imputed an income of 
$83,200.920 On appeal, Horne argued that the lower court used insufficient factual findings to 
double his imputed income.921 The supreme court vacated the lower court’s decision, holding 
that it could not affirm the imputed income determination due to the lack of findings.922 Without 
examining specific types or availability of jobs, the lower court could not adequately determine 
that Horne underestimated his earning potential.923 Vacating the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that the lower court’s lack of factual findings in determining imputed income 
were insufficient for appellate review of the decision.924 
 
Matthew P. v. Gail S. 
In Matthew P. v. Gail S.,925 the supreme court held that the superior court’s evaluation of a 
child’s emotional needs, as well as the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and 
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child, as factors 
in determining whether shared physical custody was in a child’s best interest, was not an abuse 
of discretion.926 Following the child’s parents’ divorce, the two parents shared physical custody 
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of their daughter.927 When the superior court found that the father committed an incident of 
domestic violence, it concluded it was in the child’s best interests that the mother be awarded 
primary physical custody, with the father being only permitted supervised visitation and 
unmonitored phone calls.928 The father moved to modify custody to allow more contact with the 
child, but instead the court found no material change in circumstances, and in fact found that 
tightening the restrictions on the father’s interactions with the child were in her best interests, 
and the father appealed.929 The supreme court held that the superior court’s evaluation of the 
child’s emotional needs was not an abuse of discretion, its assessment of each parent’s 
willingness to foster a relationship between the child and the other parent was reasonable, and it 
adequately articulated a plan through which the father could achieve unsupervised 
visitation.930 Thus, the supreme court affirmed and held that the superior court did not abuse its 
discretion in weighing each factor and determining that continuing restrictions on visitation were 
appropriate.931 
 
Moore v. Moore 
In Moore v. Moore,932 the supreme court held that a trial court acts within its discretion in 
declining to restrict international visitation to Hague Convention signatory nations, as long as it 
considers the relevant factors in its custody decision.933 In a divorce proceeding between the 
Moores, the trial court granted sole legal and primary physical custody to the mother, while 
awarding the father unrestricted visitation, including visitation to foreign countries.934 On appeal, 
the mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting unrestricted international 
visitation because Micronesia, the proposed country of travel, is not a signatory to the Hague 
Convention and because the father had demonstrated a propensity to disobey the law and a risk 
of absconding with the child.935 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the trial court properly considered the relevant factors in making its custody 
determination, including the risk of non-return and the reason for the visit.936 The supreme court 
further reasoned that no Alaskan law restricts international travel as part of custody visitation, 
and no evidence substantiated the mother’s subjective fear that the father would abscond with the 
child.937 Affirming the trial court’s decision, the supreme court held that a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion in granting a parent unrestricted international visitation when it considers 
relevant factors including the risk of non-return and the reason for the visitation.938 
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Norris v. Norris 
In Norris v. Norris,939 the supreme court held a child custody action was properly dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),940 when another custody action involving the same dispute had 
already been initiated in a different state, and the other state properly exercised jurisdiction under 
the UCCJEA.941 Richard and Brianna Norris, a married couple, moved from Alaska to 
Mississippi with their one-year-old son Grant in July 2012.942 In October 2012, Richard filed for 
divorce in Mississippi, and both Richard and Brianna signed a temporary joint custody 
agreement barring both parents from traveling more than 100 miles with Grant without the 
consent of the other parent.943 In December 2012, Briana violated the custody agreement, took 
Grant with her to Fairbanks, and filed for divorce in Alaska.944 In January 2014, the superior 
court in Fairbanks dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.945 The supreme court 
ruled that the superior court properly dismissed the case, noting that, under the UCCJEA, a state 
can only make a child custody determination if another state has not already done so, or if 
another state did not properly exercise jurisdiction at the time it issued its custody order.946 Since 
Richard had already filed his action in Mississippi at the time Briana filed her action in Alaska, 
Alaska could only exercise jurisdiction if Mississippi did not have jurisdiction when the action 
was filed.947 The supreme court determined that Mississippi properly exercised jurisdiction under 
the UCCJEA.948 As a result, the supreme court held the child custody action was properly 
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because another child 
custody action involving the same dispute had already been initiated in a different state, and 
because the other state properly exercised jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.949 
 
Payton S. v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services 
In Payton S. v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Services, the supreme court held the lack of 
proper notice at the adjudication and disposition stage did not affect the outcome of a child 
custody case.950 The Office of Children’s Services took custody of two Alaska Native children 
because of their parents’ substance abuse and neglect.951 Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid 
(“CINA”) rules require that parents of Alaska Native children receive notice at least ten days 
before an adjudication hearing.952 Here, the parents were not served with a copy of the petition 
until the day of the adjudication and disposition hearing.953 The trial court terminated parental 
rights in 2014,954 and the parents appealed, arguing that the failure of notice in the proceedings 
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violated due process.955 The supreme court held that while the failure of notice in CINA 
proceedings may violate due process, parties claiming a due process violation must establish that 
they likely would have achieved a more favorable outcome with proper notice.956 The court 
reasoned that there was merely the theoretical possibility of prejudice, which is not enough to 
find a violation of due process.957 Further, any prejudice caused by the lack of notice was 
remedied during the course of the multiple subsequent proceedings and had no likely impact on 
the outcome of the case.958 The parents had counsel at every subsequent step and had multiple 
years between the adjudication and termination proceedings.959 The supreme court affirmed the 
order terminating parental rights, finding that the failure of notice did not violate the parents’ due 
process rights, as it did not affect the outcome of the case.960 
 
Remy M. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Remy M. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services,961 the supreme court held that a trial court did 
not violate a father’s right to due process when it failed to tell him that he had a right to testify 
and allowed his attorney to waive his right to testify.962 In 2014, the Office of Children’s 
Services petitioned to terminate the parental rights of two parents with a history of alcohol and 
domestic abuse.963 While the father was present for most of the trial, on the third day he was 
absent due to a substance abuse assessment.964 During and after the testimony, the trial court 
offered counsel for the father multiple opportunities to consult with her client, but his attorney 
told them she did not plan on calling him as a witness because of his anxiety issues.965 The court 
eventually ruled that the child was in need of aid due to physical harm, neglect and the parents’ 
substance abuse, and subsequently terminated both parents’ rights to the child.966 On appeal, the 
father argued that the trial court violated his right to due process since it failed to tell him that he 
had a right to testify and allowed his attorney to waive his right to testify in his absence.967 The 
supreme court affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that that there was no evidence 
that the father wanted to testify, nor that his lawyer acted against his wishes.968 The supreme 
court stated that the father had plenty of time to express his desire to testify, even after the 
termination order, yet he never did so.969 The court also stated that there was no evidence of 
ineffectiveness on the part of his attorney.970 As such, the court chose not to address whether 
parents in civil cases have the same rights as criminal defendants, as relating to substantive due 
process rights.971 Affirming the district court’s decision, the supreme court held that a trial court 
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did not violate a father’s right to due process, even though it failed to tell him that he had a right 
to testify, and allowed his attorney to waive his right to testify.972 
 
Ross v. Bauman 
In Ross v. Bauman,973 the supreme court held that a third party seeking court-ordered visitation 
with a child must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is detrimental to the child to 
limit visitation with the third party to what the child’s otherwise fit parents have determined to be 
reasonable.974 Bauman petitioned for grandparent visitation after a series of disputes between 
him and the parents of his grandchildren.975 Despite finding the parents to be fit and their 
visitation restrictions not unreasonable, the superior court issued a visitation order, concluding 
that visitation with Bauman was in the children’s best interests and that such an order was 
necessary to ensure he actually visits his grandchildren.976 On appeal, the supreme court vacated 
the lower court’s order, reasoning that the legal standard applied by the lower court ignored 
reasonable parental preferences,977 thereby violating the parents’ due process rights to make 
decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children.978 The supreme court found 
that the appropriate standard drawn from past cases is that court-ordered visitation contrary to the 
parent’s preferences must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to be in the child’s best 
interest.979 In light of this standard, the superior court’s own findings that the parents were fit and 
their visitation restrictions were not unreasonable precluded a visitation order.980 Vacating the 
visitation order and dismissing Bauman’s petition for grandparent visitation, the supreme court 
held that a third party seeking court-ordered visitation with a child must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that limiting visitation with the third party to that which the child’s 
otherwise fit parents have determined to be reasonable would be detrimental to the child.981 
 
Rowan B. v. State 
In Rowan B. v. State,982 the supreme court held a father seeking to delay proceedings to terminate 
his parental rights pending appeal of his criminal convictions for physically and sexually abusing 
his daughters, fails to establish good cause to warrant a continuance.983 In 2012, Rowan B.’s 
adult stepdaughter reported to the Office of Child Services (OCS) that Rowan had physically and 
sexually abused her over a period of time, and expressed her concern that Rowan was sexually 
abusing his biological daughter as well.984 In June 2012, OCS filed an emergency custody 
petition and removed Rowan’s three minor children.985 In January and February of 2013, the 
superior court adjudicated Rowan’s three children as Children In Need of Aid based on Rowan’s 
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physical and sexual abuse.986 After the CINA adjudication, Rowan was convicted in a separate 
criminal proceeding of twenty-nine counts of sexually abusing a minor.987 In April 2014, OCS 
petitioned to terminate Rowan’s parental rights, and Rowan requested that those proceedings be 
delayed while he appealed his criminal convictions, arguing that, if the appeal resulted in the 
reversal of his convictions it could affect the outcome of the proceedings, and would not 
prejudice the children.988 The superior court denied Rowan’s continuance request, reasoning that 
granting a continuance would delay permanency for the children, and because the court based its 
decision on independent evidence of sexual abuse, and not Rowan’s convictions alone.989 The 
supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision, ruling that the superior court did not abuse 
its discretion when it refused to continue the termination trial, since delaying permanency was 
not in the children’s’ best interests.990 Affirming the superior court’s decision, the supreme court 
held a father seeking to delay proceedings to terminate his parental rights pending appeal of his 
criminal convictions for physically and sexually abusing his daughters, fails to establish good 
cause to warrant a continuance.991 
 
Ruppe v. Ruppe 
In Ruppe v. Ruppe,992 the supreme court held that a father who had potentially overpaid his child 
support obligations during divorce proceedings was not able to credit it to his post-divorce 
obligations, because he himself had proposed to provide higher than normal payments.993 In 
December 2012, after being married for fifteen years and having a child and permanent 
guardianship over two more children, Terry and Terri Ruppe became separated.994 The superior 
court granted the divorce in July 2013, after the court had already granted Terri primary physical 
custody of the children.995 During the intervening period, Terry paid interim support obligations 
to Terri of around $4,500 a month, per a court order.996 The superior court, however, found that 
this payment amount was erroneous, and determined that Terry’s payments should have been 
around $2,000 less a month, giving him credit against future obligations totaling nearly 
$15,000.997 On appeal, Terri argued that the superior court erred by granting Terry the credit 
against future obligations.998 The supreme court overturned the superior court’s decision, stating 
that Terry did not overpay because he had previously proposed a compromise offering to pay the 
higher amount.999 The supreme court reasoned that while the formula for child support contained 
within Civil Rule 90.3, is a starting point, the formula was not dispositive.1000 The court further 
reasoned that even if there was overpayment involved, such payments should not be offset 
except in exceptional circumstances, which were absent here as Terry had suggested the higher 
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payment amount during testimony.1001 Overturning the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that a father who had potentially overpaid his child support obligations during divorce 
proceedings was not able to credit it to his post-divorce obligations, because he himself had 
proposed to provide higher than normal payments.1002 
 
Sarah D. v. John D. 
In Sarah D. v. John D., the supreme court held that domestic violence must be considered in 
custody hearings where one party has ever intended to place the other in fear of imminent 
harm.1003 The mother and father separated after their daughter turned three.1004 In divorce and 
custody proceedings, both parties made claims of abuse against one another.1005 The lower court 
conceded that the testimony presented evidence of some injury.1006 However, because neither 
had ever been placed in fear of assault, it classified only one incident, involving the mother’s 
arrest, as domestic violence.1007 It thus awarded full legal custody to the father and shared 
physical custody to both parents.1008 On appeal, the mother argued that the custody decision was 
erroneous, because the court had failed to account for the father’s domestic violence.1009 The 
supreme court vacated and remanded the lower court’s custody decision, reasoning that the lower 
court should have elicited more information from the mother to determine which incidents were 
abusive.1010 It also noted that the test for finding domestic violence was whether either party 
intended to place the other in fear of imminent harm, not whether either was actually placed in 
such fear.1011 Vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that 
domestic violence must be considered in custody hearings where one party has ever intended to 
place the other in fear of imminent harm.1012 
 
Shirley M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services 
In Shirley M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Services,1013 the supreme court held that the 
Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) was permitted to deviate from the statutory priority list 
for child custody, in light of clear and convincing evidence that the child’s great-grandmother 
was incapable of meeting the needs of the child.1014 OCS removed the child from her mother’s 
custody after several instances involving drugs, prostitution, and theft.1015 While in temporary 
foster care, it was determined that the child had a number of significant physical and mental 
disabilities, including severe tremors, delayed fine motor skill development, and symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress disorder.1016 The child’s condition left her unable to feed and dress herself 
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and she required special education and weekly therapy.1017 The child’s foster parent, who had a 
master’s degree in public health and worked as a nurse for people with disabilities, worked with 
the child at home on speech and occupational therapy.1018 The child’s mother petitioned OCS to 
have the child placed in the custody of her great-grandmother.1019 OCS determined that great-
grandmother was unfit to have custody of th0e child, due to her inability to meet the child’s 
special needs and her inability to acknowledge that the child’s biological mother has a drug 
addiction and is in need of psychological treatment.1020 Declining to address the question of 
whether a great-grandmother is considered in the statutory definition of adult family member, the 
court held that OCS’s decision was proper, in light of the clear and convincing evidence that the 
child’s placement with her foster parent was in her best interest.1021 The court reasoned that the 
great-grandmother could not properly care for the child due to her inability to demonstrate that 
she could meet the child’s special needs, and due to the fact that the child’s mother had 
previously lived at the great-grandmother’s home and could possibly to return to live 
there.1022 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court determined that the clear and 
convincing evidence in the record permitted OCS to deviate from the statutory priority list for 
child custody and place the child in her foster parent’s care.1023 
 
Snider v. Snider 
In Snider v. Snider,1024 the supreme court held that a party to a divorce proceeding is allowed to 
reopen evidence if he reasonably believed at trial that there would be an opportunity to present 
evidence at a later time.1025 In 2013, Michele Snider informed her husband, Thad Snider, that she 
wanted to leave Alaska and get a divorce.1026 Thad and Michele’s divorce proceeding began in 
October 2013 and Thad moved for a continuance in mid-December 2013, claiming that he was 
underprepared without a trial brief or witness list.1027 The superior court never denied the 
continuance, but did state on December 24, 2013 that the trial would conclude at the end of the 
day.1028 Thad was confused about the timeline of the case and filed affidavits from his father and 
brother in January 2014, which were excluded when Michele’s motion to strike the affidavits 
was granted.1029 The superior court denied Thad’s motion for reconsideration and granted 
Michele primary physical custody of their son.1030 Thad appealed, arguing that the superior court 
led him to believe he could present additional evidence after December 24 and that his father and 
brother should be allowed to testify.1031 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to reopen important evidence 
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that a party believed he could present.1032 The court noted that the superior court’s instructions 
were unclear and it was not clarified that evidence was to close on December 24 until that day’s 
proceedings were already underway.1033 The court vacated the superior court’s decisions and 
remanded for further proceedings.1034 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held a party to a divorce proceeding is allowed to reopen evidence if he reasonably believed at 
trial that there would be an opportunity to present evidence at a later time.1035 
 
Susan M. v. Paul H. 
In Susan M. v. Paul H.,1036 the supreme court held that unilateral denial of custodial visitation on 
the basis of repeated custody violations meets the standard of “just cause.”1037 The parties are the 
divorced parents of four children.1038 Paul was granted sole custody and Susan was granted 
supervised visitation; however, Susan retained custodial rights while Paul worked rotations on 
the North Slope.1039 During one of these rotations, Paul discovered that Susan had taken the 
children out of Alaska and that they were living in other states.1040 Susan alleged her actions 
were in response to Paul abusing the children.1041 After their return, Susan was charged with 
custodial interference and a custody investigation found recommended Paul retain 
custody.1042 Paul then unilaterally denied Susan’s visitation rights.1043 The superior court denied 
Susan’s motion for sanctions as a result of the denied visits.1044 On appeal, Susan argued the 
superior court erred in holding that Paul’s reasons for denying visitation did not meet the 
standard of just cause.1045 The supreme court reasoned that a parent acts with just cause when the 
denial of visitation is based in good faith and is a reasonable judgment based on the best interests 
of the children.1046 However, the court strongly condemned parental resort to self-help in the 
form of a unilateral denial.1047 Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the supreme court affirmed the 
lower court’s conclusion that evidence of Susan’s repeated violations of supervision 
requirements supported Paul’s denial and provided just cause.1048 
 
Sylvia L. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services 
In Sylvia L. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services,1049 the supreme court held that the 
state could take children away from a parent when a state agency did its best to keep the family 
together in light of the parent’s unwillingness to engage with state social workers and follow 
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their advice.1050 The Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services 
(“OCS”) sought to end the parental rights of Sylvia L. (“Sylvia”) to three children after she failed 
to communicate with OCS for several months and declined to follow the agency’s 
recommendations that she seek treatment for mental health and drug abuse problems.1051 OCS 
made medical referrals for Sylvia’s mental health and drug abuse, and the agency tried to contact 
her many times when she failed to follow through on obtaining treatment.1052 On appeal, Sylvia 
argued that OCS did not make reasonable efforts to keep her united with her two non-Indian 
children and did not make active efforts, as required by federal statute, to keep her united with 
her Indian child.1053 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that OCS 
made sufficient efforts given the circumstances to keep all three children with their mother by 
attempting to assist the mother with her health for years.1054 The court further reasoned that OCS 
efforts to help Sylvia were not required to be flawless, but could be evaluated based on Sylvia’s 
unwillingness to engage with OCS and accept its parenting advice.1055 Affirming the lower 
court’s decision, the supreme court held that the state could take children away from a parent 
when a state agency did its best to keep the family together in light of the parent’s unwillingness 
to engage with state social workers and follow their advice.1056 
 
Theresa L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services 
In Theresa L. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, the supreme court held that the 
statutory language and legislative history of AS 47.10.011(8)(A) requires clear and convincing 
evidence of a significant or severe problem in functioning or behavior to find a child suffers a 
mental injury.1057 The Office of Children Services petitioned to terminate a mother’s rights to her 
children alleging that they were in need of aid due to mental injury.1058 The lower court decided 
that OCS had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid due 
to one of the children’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged “boundary issues,” 
and general “behavior.”1059 On appeal, the Department of Health and Social Services argued that 
specific examples of behavior, including one of the children licking his mother’s face during a 
family therapy session, support the conclusion that the children had substantial impairments by a 
preponderance of the evidence.1060 The supreme court reversed the lower court’s decision, 
reasoning that, under the proper standard of clear and convincing evidence, the behavioral 
instances did not rise to the level of a significant or severe problem in functioning or behavior as 
the statute requires.1061 The plain meaning indicates that mental injury must be serious, and the 
legislative history indicates an intent to narrow the circumstances in which mental injury 
applied.1062 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that the Office of 
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Children Services requires clear and convincing evidence of a significant or severe problem to 
determine a child suffers a mental injury under the statute.1063 
 
Wells v. Barile 
In Wells v. Barile,1064 the supreme court held that it may be proper to grant child support after a 
significant modification in custody, even if the moving party did not request it.1065 After a 
divorce, Wells and Barile agreed to share physical custody of their son equally.1066 Wells later 
remarried and had two children with her second husband, before divorcing him as well.1067 After 
her this divorce, the court granted the second husband full custody of the two children from that 
marriage, citing Wells’ self-harm, substance abuse, and leaving the children 
unattended.1068 Barile then motioned for full custody of his son, arguing a substantial change in 
circumstances.1069 The court granted his motion and, ordered Wells pay Barile child support, 
without Barile requesting it.1070 On appeal, Wells argued that the lower court relied on improper 
evidence to find a substantial change in circumstances and that the it abused its discretion by 
ordering unrequested child support payments.1071 The supreme court held that the lower court’s 
review of evidence was sufficient and that such a significant medication in the physical custody 
schedule warranted a new child support determination.1072 Affirming the lower court’s ruling, the 
supreme court held that it may be proper to grant child support after a significant modification in 
custody, even if the moving party did not request it.1073 
 
Wilson v. State 
In Wilson v. State,1074 the supreme court held that the superior court’s findings that a elderly 
woman was incapacitated, unable to take care of her medical conditions, and unable to afford her 
house due to her family’s misuse of her funds, and thus required partial public guardianship and 
a public conservator, was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.1075 Helen, 
an elderly woman, lived in her own house but became unable to manage her medications, 
nutrition, and finances independently, due to delirium, age-related cognitive decline, and other 
physical and mental issues.1076 Her son and grandson lived in the house with her but did not help 
her manage her health or finances, and impeded the assistant services assigned to aid 
Helen.1077 Helen continued to support her son and grandson with often excessive payments, but 
the master found that Helen will be unable to afford care if she did not sell her home.1078 The 
superior court appointed a partial public guardian and full conservator on the grounds that Helen 
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was unable to provide the essential requirements for her own physical health without assistance, 
and could not manage her property effectively, and Helen appealed.1079 The supreme court held 
that it is proper for expert witnesses to consider inadmissible information when formulating 
expert opinions, that the experts determined Helen needed this assistance to manage her health, 
and that there was no evidence that Helen’s misdiagnoses and prescribed medication caused her 
condition.1080 The supreme court further reasoned that the elderly woman needed a conservator 
because she would be unable to move back into her home if her sons did not pay rent or comply 
with her personal care assistants.1081 Thus, the supreme court affirmed and held that the superior 
court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, because there was substantial evidence that Helen 
would not be able to take care of her medical conditions and must sell the house in order to 
afford her treatment, since her sons had been misappropriating her funds.1082 
  
                                                
1079 Id. at 558–59. 
1080 Id. at 556–57. 
1081 Id. at 558–59. 
1082 Id. 
 79 
HEALTH LAW 
 
Brandner v. Bateman 
In Brandner v. Bateman,1083 the supreme court held that participants in medical review 
proceedings are immune if their actions (1) occur after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts, 
(2) are reasonably believed to be necessary, and (3) are not motivated by malice.1084 In 2010, the 
Alaska State Medical Board ordered Dr. Michael Brandner to submit to psychiatric and medical 
evaluations upon receiving a report that he threatened a state employee.1085 Brandner was found 
fit to practice and returned to work, but his continued erratic behavior concerned the Medical 
Staff Executive Committee (“Committee”), so they also ordered him to undergo an 
evaluation.1086 Once the Committee learned that the Alaska State Medical Board had already 
ordered Brandner to be evaluated, which he never reported, the Committee voted to terminate 
Brandner.1087 A hearing panel, consisting of Dr. Bateman, Dr. Christensen, and Dr. Olivas, 
agreed with the Committee’s decision.1088 Brandner sued the doctors on the hearing panel and the 
superior court ruled that the doctors are immune because they properly participated in a review 
proceeding.1089 On appeal, Brandner argued that the doctors acted improperly and his termination 
was not warranted.1090 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the 
doctors are immune because they made a reasonable effort to ascertain the facts, reasonably 
believed their actions were necessary, and were not motivated by malice.1091 The court noted that 
the doctors on the hearing panel made a comprehensive fact-finding effort, which included a full 
evidentiary hearing and written report, relied on a reasonable interpretation of hospital policy, 
and acted with no indication of ill will.1092 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that participants in medical review proceedings are immune if their actions (1) occur 
after reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts, (2) are reasonably believed to be necessary, (3) and 
are not motivated by malice.1093 
 
Hagen v. Strombel 
In Hagen v. Strombel,1094 the supreme court held a plaintiff must present expert testimony to 
establish the standard of care in a medical negligence suit in order for there to be a genuine issue 
of material fact as to the appropriate standard of care.1095 Cardiologists performed pacemaker 
surgery on Mr. Hagen and ordered an x-ray; a radiologist who viewed the x-rays noted a 
potential nodule in Mr. Hagen’s lung, and recommended follow-up x-rays.1096 However, Mr. 
Hagen was never informed of the radiologist’s recommendations, and Mr. Hagen died from lung 
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cancer two years later.1097 Mrs. Hagen alleged the cardiologists’ failure to relay the radiologist’s 
recommendation resulted in a lost chance of survival for Mr. Hagen.1098 The superior court 
granted summary judgment to the cardiologists on the grounds that expert testimony from a 
board-certified cardiologist was required to establish the standard of care, and Mrs. Hagen did 
not present it.1099 On appeal, Mrs. Hagen argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the cardiologist who ordered the x-ray later received the radiologist’s report. Affirming 
the lower court’s opinion, the supreme court reasoned that this issue is not material to the 
superior court’s decision regarding the necessity of expert testimony to establish the standard of 
care.1100 Affirming the lower court’s opinion, the supreme court held that expert testimony is 
necessary to establish the standard of care in a medical negligence suit.1101 
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INSURANCE LAW 
 
Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Co. 
In Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Co.,1102 the supreme court held that a commercial general 
liability insurance policy’s employee exclusion applies when an injury occurs during 
employment.1103 Generally, employers may purchase three types of non-overlapping insurance: 
general commercial liability, workers’ compensation, and employers’ liability.1104 Chatari, a 
business owner, had general commercial liability insurance, but not workers’ compensation 
insurance.1105 Following a personal injury action against Chatari by Devine, a volunteer 
employee, Great Divide Insurance Co. sought a declaratory judgment stating that no coverage 
applied due to the employee exclusion provision in Chatari’s policy, which applies to injuries 
during the course of employment.1106 The lower court granted summary judgment for Great 
Divide, because the injury occurred during and in the course of the injured employee’s work, and 
therefore triggered exclusion under Chatari’s policy.1107 On appeal, Devine alleged the attack 
leading to his injury did not arise out of his work and should not fall under the exclusion.1108 The 
supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, reasoning that the an insurance policy is 
evaluated using the reasonable expectations doctrine, and therefore, commercial general liability 
insurance policies exclude liability when an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, 
as defined per workers’ compensation law.1109 The court further reasoned that where an employer 
has foreknowledge of an attack but does not warn, as Chatari did, he has engendered, 
exacerbated, or facilitated the attack as a matter of law, thereby designating the injury as one 
occurring during employment and triggering the general commercial liability insurance’s 
exclusion.1110 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that personal injuries 
arising under and in the course of employment trigger the employee exclusion of commercial 
general liability insurance policies.1111 
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NATIVE LAW 
 
Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State 
In Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. State,1112 the supreme court held that regulations 
establishing different systems of subsistence hunting for communities and individuals are valid 
because the State can lawfully distinguish between different subsistence use patterns.1113 In 2006, 
the Alaska Board of Game made extensive findings about the Copper Basin Community Hunt 
Area, including that some Alaskans, including the Ahtna Athabascan communities in the area, 
rely on a community-based pattern of subsistence hunting.1114 The Board promulgated new 
regulations that bifurcated subsistence hunting into community hunts and individual hunts, with 
more favorable rules for the community-based subsistence hunting.1115 The Alaska Fish and 
Wildlife Conservation Fund challenged these regulations, but the Superior Court held that the 
regulations were within the Board’s statutory power and did not violate the Alaska 
constitution.1116 The Fund appealed, arguing that the regulations violate the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the subsistence hunting statutes, and the equal access clauses of the Alaska 
constitution.1117 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling the regulations are 
lawful and there is a constitutionally valid distinction between subsistence hunting 
patterns.1118 The court reasoned that the regulations do not violate the equal access clauses of the 
Alaska constitution because all Alaskans are eligible to receive a community harvest permit so 
long as they join a subsistence hunting group.1119 The court also noted that the plain language of 
Alaska fish and game statutes grants the Board the authority to differentiate between subsistence 
uses and issue community permits.1120 Further, the court found the subsistence hunting 
regulations do not violate the Administrative Procedure Act because the Board’s amendments to 
the regulations were properly noticed.1121 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme 
court held that regulations establishing different systems of subsistence hunting for communities 
and individuals are valid because the State can lawfully distinguish between different subsistence 
use patterns.1122 
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PROPERTY LAW 
 
Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross 
In Alaskasland.com, LLC v. Cross,1123 the supreme court held that a state law tort claim for 
misappropriation of advertising efforts is preempted by federal copyright law.1124 Alaskaland, the 
developer of a subdivision, sued realtor Kevin Cross after Cross used photographs from 
Alaskaland’s website in a listing advertising property for sale.1125 In 2012, Alaskaland sued 
Cross for misappropriation of its advertising.41126 The lower court found that the 
misappropriation tort claim had not been recognized under state law, but even if it were 
Alaskaland’s claim would fail because it did not satisfy the required elements of the tort.1127 On 
appeal, Alaskaland argued that the supreme court should recognize the common law 
misappropriation tort because Cross exploited Alaskaland’s advertising efforts when he used its 
photographs.1128 The supreme court affirmed the lower court on different grounds, reasoning that 
even if Alaska did recognize the common law misappropriation tort Alaskaland’s claim would be 
preempted by federal copyright law.1129 The court said that Alaskaland’s argument that Cross 
had taken advantage of its advertising efforts was the kind of problem the federal Copyright Act 
was meant to address.1130 The court said that Alaskaland should have pursued an injunction 
under the Copyright Act to stop Cross from using its photographs without 
permission.1131 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a state tort 
claim for misappropriation of advertising efforts is preempted by federal copyright law.1132 
 
Baker v. Ryan Air, Inc. 
In Baker v. Ryan Air, Inc.,1133 the supreme court held that despite a contract’s anti-waiver 
provision, a sublessor may waive his right to object to a sublessee’s renovations first by having 
prior knowledge of the renovations and later by expressly approving them.1134 Ryan Air made 
renovations to the airport lot it subleased from Baker.1135 In keeping with the terms of their 
contract, Ryan Air first obtained the necessary permit for renovations from the state Department 
of Transportation, which Baker then expressly approved in an email to the 
Department.1136 Although Ryan Air’s plans ultimately exceeded those specified by the permit, 
Baker knew about the full scope of the project more than two years before his emailed 
approval.1137 Subsequently, Baker claimed breach of contract against Ryan Air because he never 
consented to the renovations and because the project exceeded the scope of the 
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permit.1138 Further, Baker argued that an anti-waiver provision in the sublease agreement, stating 
that the failure of a party to object to a breach of the contract does not waive the right to do so in 
the future, meant his acquiescence to Ryan Air’s alleged breach did not constitute a 
waiver.1139 The supreme court, noting that its goal in interpreting a contract is to give effect to 
the reasonable expectations of the parties, rejected Baker’s claim on two grounds.1140 First, the 
court reasoned that Baker’s explicit approval of the renovations in his email amounted to a 
waiver, citing precedent upholding waiver of contractual rights even under contracts with more 
stringent anti-waiver language.1141 Second, the court reasoned that though Ryan Air’s exceeding 
of the approved permit may have implied Baker lacked knowledge of the other party’s full intent, 
Baker’s testimony indicated that he knew the full scope of the project two years before he 
authorized it.1142 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that, 
notwithstanding a contract’s anti-waiver provision, a sublessor may waive his right to object to a 
sublessee’s renovations by having prior knowledge of the renovations and by expressly 
approving them.1143 
 
Castle Properties, Inc. v. Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene 
In Castle Properties, Inc. v. Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene, the court held that a party 
having right of first refusal to purchase a property receives adequate notice of the terms of an 
offer when he is aware of the material facts.1144 Castle Properties purchased interests in land, 
including the right of first refusal to purchase adjoining property belonging to Wasilla Lake 
Church (“the Church”).1145 The Church entered negotiations with the City of Wasilla to exchange 
their property for a different parcel of land.1146 Castle was notified of this exchange through a 
city ordinance, but the Church rejected its inquiries into the exact terms, such as exact 
acreage.1147 Knowing from the ordinance which lands were involved, Castle made what it 
deemed an “equivalent” cash offer.1148 When the Church refused to accept, Castle brought suit 
seeking specific performance of its right of first refusal, claiming it did not receive adequate 
notice of the City’s offer to enable it to make an equivalent offer.1149 On appeal, the supreme 
court reasoned that Castle had enough information from the ordinance to know that its offer was 
far below the value of the exchange property.1150 It reasoned that knowing the exact acreage 
would not have changed the outcome, because the acreage was actually less than supposed.1151 It 
also noted that other specific terms, such as allocation of closing costs, were not material to 
price.1152 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a party having right of first 
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refusal to purchase a property receives adequate notice of the terms of an offer when he is aware 
of the material facts.1153 
 
Luker v. Sykes 
In Luker v. Sykes, the supreme court held that a federally granted right of way cannot exist over 
lands reserved for private uses at the time their survey section lines are created.1154 Landowners 
purchased land previously owned by their neighbor.1155 They disputed whether there was a right 
of way over a section of the property used as a road.1156 The neighbor argued that there was a 
federally-granted right of way pursuant to federal law because a public highway had been created 
before the land was granted for private use.1157 The superior court noted that the time of private 
entry as determined by government recognition of survey section lines was critical. It found that 
the original owner did not officially acquire a right to homestead the land until after the road was 
created and, therefore, held there was a federally-granted right of way.1158 Reversing, the 
supreme court noted that the actual initial entry of the property owner creates survey section 
lines, so long as entry on the property is later validated.1159 The court reasoned the original owner 
had filed his first entry onto the property before a road was created on the property, although his 
entry was not validated until after.1160 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that a 
federally granted right of way can not exist over land reserved for private uses at the time their 
survey section lines are created.1161 
 
State, Department of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. 
In State, Department of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc.,1162 the supreme court held the 
application of a “use value” standard is not improper for assessing oil and gas property for tax 
purposes.1163 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (“TAPS”) is an 800-mile-long oil pipeline that 
connects northern Alaskan oil reserves to a shipping terminal in the southern city of 
Valdez.1164 Under state law, municipalities may raise and collect taxes on oil and gas property, 
but the Department of Revenue has the power to assess the value of that property.1165 A party 
may appeal the Department of Revenue’s assessment to the State Assessment Review Board, and 
the Board’s decision is appealable to the superior court.1166 All the parties appealed various 
aspects of the superior court’s assessment of TAPS’ value for 2007, 2008, and 2009.1167 On 
appeal, TAPS owners argued that the value of TAPS for tax assessment purposes must be based 
only on the tariff income it generates, not based on a “use value” standard.1168 The supreme court 
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affirmed the superior court’s decision to value TAPS based on the “use value” standard, 
reasoning that there is no authority supporting the position that the assessment must be based on 
tariff income generated.1169 The court further reasoned that there was no market for TAPS as a 
stand-alone investment based on its tariff income, and that it was specifically designed for its 
particular use of moving oil.1170 Thus, nothing is fundamentally wrong with using the “use 
value” principle here.1171 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held the 
application of a “use value” standard for tax assessment purposes is not improper to value a 
pipeline with the highest use of transporting oil to the market.1172 
 
Tagaban v. City of Pelican 
In Tagaban v. City of Pelican,1173 the supreme court held that the City was not required to give 
notice of foreclosure to lienholders of a property.1174 Tagaban won a judgment against the Kake 
Tribal Corporation in 1998 which was recorded as a lien on tribal property within the City of 
Pelican.1175 Ownership later shifted to a management company, and the lien was extended.1176 In 
2010, without direct notice to Tagaban, the City foreclosed on the property for delinquency in 
property taxes.1177 Tagaban challenged the lack of notice to lienholders and the constitutionality 
of the state foreclosure statutes.1178 The superior court granted summary judgment to the City 
because the lien expired after ten years according to statute.1179 On appeal, Tagaban contended 
the lien extension was valid and again challenged the lack of notice.1180 The supreme court held 
that the state foreclosure statutes only require notice to property owners, not lienholders.1181 The 
court further reasoned that the statute does not violate due process rights of lienholders because 
the statute provides a means to request foreclosure notice to protect minor property 
interests.1182 Tagaban did not pursue this process.1183 Tagaban’s interest was also not reasonably 
ascertainable because he did not adequately record his lien extension.1184 The supreme court 
affirmed the superior court holding that the City was not required to give notice of foreclosure to 
lienholders.1185 
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TORT LAW 
 
Brandner v. Pease 
 In Brandner v. Pease,1186 the supreme court held that evidence on how a treatment affects 
patients in general is insufficient to establish causation in medical malpractice suits if it fails to 
show how the specific patient might have been affected.1187 After undergoing emergency heart 
surgery in 2009, Michael Brandner sued his anesthesiologist Robert Pease for failure to use a 
properly functioning transesophageal echo probe during surgery.1188 Brandner said he suffered 
short-term memory loss and other injuries from the anesthesia during surgery, and he cited an 
expert’s statement that using the probe generally produced better outcomes for patients.1189 The 
lower court excluded the testimony of Brandner’s expert and granted summary judgment for 
Pease.1190 On appeal, Brandner argued that his expert’s testimony should allow him to withstand 
summary judgment.1191 The supreme court affirmed the lower court, reasoning that Brandner’s 
expert never testified that the failure to use a working probe caused any of Brandner’s 
injuries.1192 The court said that evidence showing patients typically do better if they receive a 
certain treatment is insufficient to establish causation.1193 The court ruled that Brandner’s expert 
needed to provide specific details, such as by explaining what percentage of patients have better 
outcomes when a probe is used, to show how Brandner in particular might have been 
affected.1194 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that evidence on how a 
treatment affects patients in general is insufficient to establish causation in medical malpractice 
suits if it fails to show how the specific patient might have been affected.1195 
 
City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan 
In City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan,1196 the supreme court held that jury instructions in a wrongful 
death action cannot preclude the jury from allocating fault between parties.1197 On July 28, 2011, 
Louis Bunyan hanged himself with his sweatpants drawstring while in the custody of the Hooper 
Bay Police Department (“HBPD”).1198 Earlier that day, the HBPD arrested Bunyan after he 
became intoxicated and fought with family members.1199 Bunyan had scars on his arms that 
indicated self-harm and began to yell and hit his cell wall.1200 One of the arresting officers 
testified that he did not find any information about Bunyan in the HBPD records, even though 
the HBPD records documented four separate incidents in which Bunyan had threatened 
suicide.1201 Bunyan’s mother filed a wrongful death action against the City of Hooper Bay 
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(“City”) and the superior court ruled that the City was negligent, entering a $1,078,233 
judgment.1202 The City appealed, arguing that the jury was not properly instructed on the 
possibility of allocating fault between Bunyan and the City.1203 The supreme court reversed the 
lower court’s decision, reasoning that the jury instructions were erroneous because they 
effectively precluded the jury from allocating fault between Bunyan and the City.1204 The court 
noted that Alaska law requires apportionment of damages where more than one person is at fault 
and the jury instructions foreclosed the possibility of allocating fault between the parties.1205 The 
court vacated the judgment against the City.1206 Reversing the lower court’s decision, the 
supreme court held that jury instructions in a wrongful death action cannot preclude the jury 
from allocating fault between parties.1207 
 
Foondle v. O’Brien 
In Foondle v. O’Brien, the supreme court held that the greater culpability of criminal conduct 
supersedes subsequent attorney negligence, and a showing of actual innocence is required for a 
malpractice claim.1208 Foondle was convicted for felony driving under the influence as he had 
twice been convicted of DUI in the previous ten years.1209 Foondle filed multiple petitions for 
post-conviction relief and discharged his attorneys.1210 Ultimately, the superior court set aside 
Foondle’s felony DUI conviction because of issues with the plea agreement from one of the 
previous convictions.1211 Foondle subsequently claimed negligence against the attorneys for their 
failure to investigate the previous conviction.1212 The superior court dismissed his 
complaint.1213 The supreme court affirmed, holding that civil recovery should not be a way for 
criminal defendants to shift responsibility for the consequences of their criminal acts.1214 The 
court reasoned that significant public policy rationales limit the ability of criminals to recover 
from their defense attorneys for professional malpractice.1215 Affirming the lower court’s 
decision, the supreme court found that proof of actual innocence is required to allow a convicted 
felon to recover from their attorney on a professional malpractice claim.1216 
 
Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. 
 In Hunter v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.,1217 the supreme court held the lower court failed to 
properly apply the “weight of the evidence” standard when it ruled on a motion for a new trial 
and remanded for renewed consideration of the motion.1218 After Benjamin Francis died of lung 
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cancer, Dolores Hunter filed a wrongful death action against Phillip Morris.1219 The superior 
court granted Phillip Morris’ motion in limine to preclude Hunter from referencing findings of 
facts and conclusion from a prior federal lawsuit against Phillip Morris.1220 At the conclusion of 
the trial, the jury found that, while Phillip Morris made false or misleading statements about its 
product, Francis had not heard those statements and, therefore, ruled in favor of Phillip 
Morris.1221 The superior court subsequently granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial and then 
reversed its own decision, denying the new trial after reconsidering the proper standard for the 
motion.1222 On appeal, Hunter argued that the lower court erred when it deviated from the 
“weight of evidence” standard and reversed its decision to grant a new trial.1223 The supreme 
court held that the “weight of evidence” standard was the proper metric to determine whether a 
new trial is necessary in the interests of justice.1224 Reversing the lower court’s ruling, the 
supreme court held that the “weight of the evidence” is the proper standard when ruling on a 
motion for a new trial and remanded the case for renewed consideration of the motion.1225 
 
Miller v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation 
In Miller v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation,1226 the supreme court held that a claim is barred 
by state sovereign immunity when a claimant alleges only misrepresentation, rather than 
negligence.1227 Four years after the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEP) certified 
an area as safe for shellfish farming, Miller was granted an application to open an oyster 
farm.1228 After several years of production, dozens of people became sick after eating Miller’s 
oysters and he was forced to close the farm.1229 Miller filed a complaint against DEP, claiming 
DEP conducted its survey of the area negligently and his reliance on their representation was the 
proximate cause of his loses.1230 The lower court granted summary judgment on behalf of DEP, 
holding that Miller only presented a misrepresentation claim, which is barred by state sovereign 
immunity.1231 On appeal, Miller argued that he submitted sufficient evidence of negligence, 
which is not barred by state sovereign immunity.1232 The supreme court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, holding it need not determine if Miller submitted sufficient evidence of 
negligence since neither his original nor his amended complaints alleged anything other than 
detrimental reliance on DEP’s misrepresentation.1233 Though Miller cited several cases of 
negligence that included misrepresentations, the court distinguished those cases as ones where 
the misrepresentations were collateral to an independent negligence claim, rather than at the 
heart of the claim.1234 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court held that a claim is 
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barred by state sovereign immunity when a claimant alleges only misrepresentation, rather than 
negligence.1235 
 
Oakley Enterprises, LLC v. NPI, LLC 
In Oakley Enterprises, LLC v. NPI, LLC,1236 the supreme court held that a jury’s finding of 
avoidable consequences was not apportionment and, therefore, that the lower court did not err in 
ordering contribution.1237 Whitney leased wood chipping equipment from NPI, and Friesen and 
Oakley permitted him to keep the equipment on their property.1238 After diesel spills from the 
equipment were discovered, Whitney abandoned most of the equipment on the 
property.1239 Friesen and Oakley sued NPI for damages from the spill.1240 The jury found Friesen 
could have avoided all or part of the spill and reduced his award by 20 percent, according to the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences.1241 The court then employed contribution to equitably 
allocate the damages and allocated 48 percent of the fault to Friesen.1242 On appeal, Friesen 
argued that the jury’s finding of avoidable consequences apportioned harm and, therefore, 
contribution was unnecessary.1243 The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, reasoning 
that the jury was specifically instructed, both by the court and by counsel in closing arguments, 
that it was not apportioning fault.1244 Affirming the lower court’s decision, the supreme court 
held that a jury’s finding of avoidable consequences was not apportionment and, therefore, the 
that lower court did not err in ordering contribution.1245 
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TRUST & ESTATES LAW 
 
In Re Estate of Bavilla 
In Re Estate of Bavilla,1246 the supreme court held the superior court abused its discretion in 
denying a motion to amend an application for informal probate where none of the exceptions to 
Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) applied and where there was no statutory bar precluding the superior 
court from converting the informal probate hearing to a formal proceeding.1247 Etta Bavilla 
applied for informal probate of her mother’s 1987 will.1248 The mother, Offenesia Bavilla, 
executed a new will in 2006, and the new will eliminated Etta Bavilla from any 
inheritance.1249 Etta Bavilla’s application was left open pending further filings.1250 In November 
2012, Etta Bavilla subsequently filed a motion to declare the 2006 will invalid.1251 Her 
application for informal probate of her mother’s will was denied at a hearing for the November 
2012 motion.1252 Thereafter, Etta Bavilla asked for leave to file an amended pleading contesting 
the 2006 will.1253 Her motion to amend was also denied.1254 She appealed, arguing that the 
superior court erred in denying her motion to amend and in not investigating her claim of 
wrongdoing in the crafting of the 2006 will.1255 The supreme court held that the superior court 
should have allowed Etta Bavilla to amend her application for informal probate of the 1987 will 
to contest the 2006 will.1256 The court reasoned that under Alaska Civil Rule 15(a), leave to 
amend should be freely given because none of the exceptions to the rule applied.1257 There is no 
statutory bar preventing the superior court from converting an informal probate hearing to a 
formal one.1258 Thus, the court reasoned that it was unclear why the lower court prohibited Etta 
Bavilla from contesting the validity of the will as part of a probate proceeding.1259 The supreme 
court reversed and remanded to the superior court, allowing Etta Bavilla to amend her filing to 
contest the 2006 will.1260 
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